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THE PATH FROM REGULATOR TO HUNTER: THE EXERCISE OF 
PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION IN THE INVESTIGATION OF 
PHYSICIANS AT TEACHING HOSPITALS 
PAMELA H. BUCY* 
This article examines the economic and cultural disruption that a law 
enforcement initiative can have on an industry by focusing on a recent federal 
law enforcement health care fraud initiative, Physicians at Teaching Hospitals 
(“PATH”).  The PATH initiative is an apt case study: it is nation-wide, was 
undertaken after a deliberative process among multiple federal agencies, and is 
focused on a limited group of health care providers regarding few legal and 
reimbursement issues.  Part I of this article describes the PATH initiative.  Part 
II briefly examines the arsenal of sanctions available to the government to 
pursue health care fraud, focusing on the False Claims Act (“FCA”), the statute 
utilized in the PATH initiative.  Part III suggests that because the investigation 
and prosecution of an industry can be disruptive to an industry and those it 
services, care must be taken to ensure that the prosecutive initiative is 
warranted. 
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I. THE PATH INITIATIVE 
A.   Background 
Because of the way in which Medicare reimburses academic medical 
centers1 and the teaching hospitals that they include, there has been 
“longstanding concern” that Medicare would pay twice for the same service: 
once under Part A, Medicare (“Medicare Part A”) and again, under Part B, 
Medicare (“Medicare Part B”).2  Medicare Part A reimburses health care 
providers for inpatient hospital services, home health services, and certain 
other institutionally based services3 for about thirty-seven million persons age 
sixty-five or older and certain categories of disabled persons.4  Medicare Part 
A pays teaching hospitals for part of the costs of training physicians 
(“residents”) by paying the hospitals’ “direct graduate medical education 
reimbursement” (“DGME”).5  In 1996, Medicare Part A paid approximately $8 
billion to teaching hospitals for the training of residents.6 
Medicare Part B reimburses health care providers for physician services, 
outpatient services, and various other medical and health services.7  Thus, 
Medicare Part B pays physicians, including teaching physicians, for services 
provided directly to Medicare patients.8  Consequently, residents who may be 
professionally capable of rendering medical services are not eligible for 
reimbursement under Medicare Part B, because their salaries already have been 
factored into the teaching hospitals’ Medicare Part A reimbursement.9  
Arguably, if Medicare Part B were to pay residents for the physician services 
they render to patients, Medicare is paying teaching hospitals twice for the 
 
 1. An “academic medical center” is defined as “university–based health centers that include 
at a minimum a hospital and associated clinics, a medical school, or one of the other health 
professions schools.” Robert M. Carey & Carolyn Long Engelhard, Academic Medicine Meets 
Managed Care: A High-impact Collision, 71 ACAD. MED. 839, 840 (1996). 
 2. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REP. NO. HEHS-98-174, MEDICARE: CONCERNS WITH 
PHYSICIANS AT TEACHING HOSPITALS (PATH) AUDITS (1998) 5-6 [hereinafter GAO, CONCERNS 
WITH PATH]. 
 3. 42 U.S.C. § 1395d(a) (1994 & Supp. III 1997); PAMELA H. BUCY, HEALTH CARE 
FRAUD: CRIMINAL, CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 1.02[2] (1996 & Supp. 1999) 
[hereinafter BUCY, HEALTH CARE FRAUD]. 
 4. Memorandum from June Gibbs Brown, Inspector General, United States Department of 
Health and Human Services, to Bruce C. Vladeck, Administrator, Health Care Financing 
Administration (HCFA), March 1996, at 3 [hereinafter Brown Memorandum]. 
 5. GAO, CONCERNS WITH PATH, supra note 2, at 5.  DGME is based upon historic costs 
that include the portion of the salaries of teaching physicians related to teaching residents, 
residents’ salaries, and other related costs. 
 6. Id. 
 7. 42 U.S.C. § 1395k (1994 & Supp. III 1997). 
 8. Brown Memorandum, supra note 4, at 4. 
 9. Id. 
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training of physicians.10 In addition, Medicare Part B reimbursement rates are 
premised upon the assumption that patient services will be rendered by 
physicians, not by physicians in training.11  In an effort to eliminate these 
problems, the Health Care Financing Administration (“HCFA”), which 
administers Medicare, has made clear that, with certain limited exceptions, 
teaching physicians billing Medicare Part B must personally provide the billed 
services or be physically present when the resident provides the services.12 
Academic medical centers have claimed confusion because of ambiguous 
guidance provided by HCFA and the multi-faceted relationship teaching 
physicians have with residents.13  Sometimes a teaching physician will be 
present when a resident is rendering services to a patient, while on other 
occasions the teaching physician will meet with the resident, review a patient’s 
chart with the resident and provide treatment instructions which the resident 
carries out.  Teaching physicians also provide direction to residents by 
discussing a patient’s situation with a group of residents and other teaching 
physicians (“Grand Rounds”).14  In these instances, the teaching physician may 
have provided considerable service to the patient but has not personally seen 
the patient.  Given this multi-faceted consultation, teaching and treatment 
relationship among teaching physicians, residents and patients, it is difficult for 
generic regulations to provide clear billing guidance. 
 
 10. As the General Counsel of the Department of Health and Human Services explained in 
1997: 
[S]upervision of interns and residents by teaching physicians is reimbursed under 
Medicare Part A through graduate medical education (GME) payments.  By this 
mechanism, teaching physicians are paid for taking responsibility for the hospital’s 
oversight of its doctors in training.  It would be absurd to assert that physicians could 
receive the significant remuneration that characterizes Part B reimbursement for 
supplying the same level of services that qualifies and was paid for as Part A services. 
Ass’n of Am. Med. Colleges v. United States, No. SA-CV 97-862 (C.D. Cal. filed Oct. 27, 1997) 
[hereinafter AAMC Complaint] (citing Letter from Harriet S. Rabb, General Counsel of the 
Department of Health and Human Services, to Jordan J. Cohen, M.D., President of the 
Association of American Medical Colleges (“AAMC”), and P. John Seward, M.D., Executive 
Vice President of AAMC, July 11, 1997 [hereinafter Rabb Letter] (visited Jan. 18, 2000) 
<http://www.aamc.org/hlthcare/path/oig711.htm>).  See also GAO, CONCERNS WITH PATH, 
supra note 2, at 5-6 (warning that Medicare will possibly have to “pay twice”); Brown 
Memorandum, supra note 4, at 4. 
 11. Rabb Letter, supra note 10, at 1-2. 
 12. Id. (noting that the standard for Medicare Part B payments to teaching physicians has 
been variously expressed as requiring “personal and identifiable direction,” “performing the 
physician services,” “supervision,” or “being present and ready to perform”). 
 13. AAMC Complaint, supra note 10, ¶ 3. 
 14. See AAMC Complaint, supra note 10, ¶ 17.  For articles chronicling residents’ and 
teaching physicians’ reaction to PATH’s impact on clinical education, see, e.g., Lloyd M. 
Krieger, Medicare Antifraud Initiatives: Effects on Resident Education, 281 JAMA 1227 (1999); 
Joseph D. Robinson & Scott Gottlieb, The New Face of Medical Education, 281 JAMA 1226 
(1999); Ruth SoRelle, Tracking a Tangled PATH, 1998 CIRCULATION 2191 (1998). 
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The Department of Health and Human Services’ (“HHS”) audit and 
investigation of Medicare Part B payments to teaching physicians led the 
Office of Inspector General (“OIG”) and HHS to commence a nationwide 
initiative known as Physicians at Teaching Hospitals (“PATH”).15  This 
initiative followed a 1995 settlement between the United States Department of 
Justice (“DOJ”) and the University of Pennsylvania (“Penn”),16 wherein Penn 
agreed to pay approximately $30 million to the DOJ, without admitting guilt.17  
The DOJ’s investigation focused on billings by teaching physicians on the 
Penn medical school faculty for services rendered to patients at Penn’s hospital 
and on possible inflation of services rendered (“upcoding”).18  HCFA took the 
position that teaching physicians could properly bill Medicare for services 
rendered to hospitalized patients only if the physician personally rendered the 
services or if the teaching physician was physically present when the services 
were rendered by the resident.19  Furthermore, if documentation in the patient 
file did not reveal that the teaching physician was physically present when the 
resident rendered the service, the OIG presumed that the physician was not 
present and that any resulting claim for reimbursement was improper.20 
There are 1,200 teaching hospitals in the United States.21  The OIG began 
its PATH initiative by selecting the 125 teaching hospitals associated with each 
of the nation’s 125 medical schools.22  In 1996, the OIG sent a letter to each of 
these 125 academic medical centers, informing them that they were subject to 
an audit of teaching physician Medicare Part B billings.23  Once a teaching 
hospital received word that it was subject to a PATH audit, it was given two 
choices.  The teaching hospital could consent to PATH I, whereby an OIG 
team would conduct, with the assistance of medical reviewers for the carrier,24 
 
 15. GAO, CONCERNS WITH PATH, supra note 2, at 1. 
 16. The target of the investigation was the Clinical Practices of the University of 
Pennsylvania (“CPUP”), which is a component of the University of Pennsylvania Health System 
(“UPHS”).  Brown Memorandum, supra note 4, at 1. 
 17. GAO, CONCERNS WITH PATH, supra note 2, at 1. 
 18. The billings at issue were submitted from January 1, 1989 through December 31, 1994.  
Id.  Although other issues also were involved, including the possibility of “upcoding,” id. at 21-
22, the dominant issue was Part B billings by teaching physicians for services possibly rendered 
by residents. 
 19. GAO, CONCERNS WITH PATH, supra note 2, at 7-8 (stating that “[m]edical records must 
contain documentation to support all services rendered.”). 
 20. Brown Memorandum, supra note 4, at 5; GAO, CONCERNS WITH PATH, supra note 2, at 
10. 
 21. GAO, CONCERNS WITH PATH, supra note 2, at 12. 
 22. Id.  See also Cheryl Baacke & Lisa M. Rockelli, IG to Audit All Hospital Academic 
Institutions Under PATH, Official Says, 7 Health L. Rep. (BNA) 1118 (July 25, 1996). 
 23. Id. 
 24. Carriers are private groups or associations hired by HCFA to administer Part B, 
Medicare.  42 U.S.C. § 1395h (1994 & Supp. III 1997).  Intermediaries are private groups or 
associations hired by the Secretary of HHS through the Health Care Financing Agency (HCFA) 
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an audit of the medical faculty’s Medicare Part B physician billings for one 
year between 1990-1996.25  Alternatively, the teaching hospital could consent 
to PATH II, whereby the teaching hospital could conduct the audit itself, at its 
own expense and under the OIG team supervision, using OIG approved 
auditors or consultants.26  Most teaching hospitals apparently have opted for 
PATH II based upon the belief that recoupment and penalties would be less 
severe under PATH II than under PATH I.27 
Within one year of announcing the PATH initiative, audits were underway 
at forty-nine institutions.28  As of November, 1999, eight PATH audits have 
been resolved.29  Four of the eight institutions have agreed to settlements with 
OIG, for a total of $64.3 million.30  Audits at the remaining four institutions 
concluded with no money being owed to the government.  Additional PATH 
audits are planned or underway at thirty-seven other institutions.31 
B. Rules and Regulations Regarding Medicare Part B Reimbursement to 
Teaching Physicians 
Targeted teaching hospitals have objected strenuously to the PATH 
initiative, arguing that the rules, regulations, and other guidance concerning 
Medicare Part B billings by teaching physicians are vague and that HHS, 
through the PATH initiative, is retroactively applying “unpublished rules, 
contrary to existing published rules” as a way to coerce settlements.32  In 1997, 
a number of teaching hospitals filed suit seeking injunctive relief.33  In this 
 
to administer Medicare Part A.  42 U.S.C. § 1395u (1994 & Supp. III 1997).  See infra notes 39-
41 and accompanying text. 
 25. See AAMC Complaint, supra note 10, ¶ 54. 
 26. Id. 
 27. According to the AAMC Complaint: “[t]he OIG/DOJ team . . . either expressly threatens 
or implies that the outcome for the targeted faculty is likely to be less favorable and the penalty to 
be assessed great under PATH I than under PATH II.”  See id. ¶ 57; see also GAO, CONCERNS 
WITH PATH, supra note 2, at 12 n.23 (stating that “[i]n return for volunteering for a PATH II 
audit, the OIG advises DOJ  of the institution’s level of cooperation . . . [which] the DOJ may 
take . . . into account when resolving losses . . . from any . . . [false claims].”). 
 28. GAO, CONCERNS WITH PATH, supra note 2, at 12.  The OIG later dropped sixteen of its 
original forty-nine PATH audits.  See GAO, CONCERNS WITH PATH, supra note 2, app. II, at 35.  
 29. The institutions included Thomas Jefferson University, Dartmouth-Hitchcock Medical 
Center, Yale University, the University of Virginia, and the University of Pittsburgh.  Id. at 2, 
Table 1. 
 30. These institutions included: Thomas Jefferson University, which settled in August, 1996, 
for $12 million; University of Virginia, which settled in November, 1997, for $8.6 million; and 
the University of Pittsburgh which settled in March, 1998, for $17 million.  Id. 
 31. GAO, CONCERNS WITH PATH, supra note 2, at 2.  See also Sean Martin, Teaching 
Physician Billing Probe Blessed by GAO, AM. MED. NEWS, Sept. 7, 1998, at 5. 
 32. AAMC Complaint, supra note 10, ¶ 2. 
 33. See generally AAMC Complaint, supra note 10.  This complaint was dismissed on April 
28, 1998, for lack of jurisdiction.  Ass’n of Am. Med. Colleges v. United States, 34 F. Supp.2d 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
8 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 44:3 
suit, the hospitals argued that HHS deprived the hospitals of due process and 
violated the agency’s own rule making procedures, the Administrative 
Procedure Act, and the Medicare Act.34  In response, HHS maintained that the 
“physically present when services are rendered” requirement is longstanding, 
and has been clearly communicated to teaching hospitals.35 
On at least eleven occasions between 1966 and 1995, HHS issued guidance 
for payment of Medicare Part B services rendered by teaching physicians.36  
HHS promulgated the first regulation in 1966 stating that a teaching 
physician’s service was reimbursable as long it was “an identifiable service 
requiring performance by a physician in person.”37  In 1967, HHS issued 
regulations specifying that Medicare Part B reimbursement was permissible 
where the “physician provides personal and identifiable direction to interns or 
residents who are participating in the care of his patient.”38 
HHS contracts with private entities (usually insurance companies) to assist 
in the administration of the Medicare program.39  These entities are designated 
“intermediaries” for Medicare Part A and “carriers” for Medicare Part B.40  
Intermediaries and carriers assume the responsibility to receive, screen and pay 
claims submitted by Medicare providers for eligible services rendered to 
Medicare patients.41  In 1969, HCFA issued Intermediary Letter 372 (“IL 
372”) for guidance to carriers and intermediaries, noting that “there appears to 
be a serious need to obtain a better and more uniform understanding among 
carriers, providers, and physicians of the conditions under which payment may 
be made under Part B for services rendered to patients by supervising 
physicians in the teaching setting.”42  IL 372 stated that in order to bill for 
 
1187 (C.D. Ca. 1998).  AAMC appealed this dismissal on June 23, 1998.  The appeal is currently 
pending before the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.  The Greater New York 
Hospital Association, joined by several New York teaching hospitals and medical schools, filed a 
similar lawsuit in the Southern District of New York.  See Text of Greater New York Hosp. Ass’n. 
Lawsuit Against HHS (visited Jan. 18, 2000) <http://healthcarenewsserver.com/stories/HCN1998 
042400003a.shtml> (text of the plaintiffs’ complaint). This suit was also dismissed for lack of 
jurisdiction.  See Greater N.Y. Hosp. Ass’n v. United States, No. 98 Civ. 2741 (RLC), 1999 WL 
1021561 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 1999). 
 34. AAMC Complaint, supra note 10, ¶¶ 72-82. 
 35. GAO, CONCERNS WITH PATH, supra note 2, at 3. 
 36. These eleven occasions are time lined in Key Events Related to the PATH Initiative.  See 
id. app. II., at 34-35. 
 37. 20 C.F.R. § 405.483(a) (1966). 
 38. 20 C.F.R. § 405.521 (1967) (recodified as 42 C.F.R. § 521). 
 39. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395h (1994 & Supp. III 1997) (involving “fiscal intermediaries”); 42 
U.S.C. § 1395u (1994 & Supp. III 1997) (involving “carriers”). 
 40. Id. 
 41. See id. §§ 1395h(a), 1395u(a) (1994). 
 42. U. S. Dep’t of Health and Human Services, Intermediary Letter No. 372 (Apr. 1969) 
[hereinafter “IL 372”], reprinted in Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH) ¶ 3459.33, at 1289-11 to 
-14 (July 17, 1997). 
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services under Medicare Part B, a teaching physician must “render sufficient 
personal and identifiable medical services to the Medicare beneficiary to 
exercise full, personal control over the management of the portion of the case 
for which a charge can be recognized.”43  “Full, personal control” required that 
the physician review the patient’s medical history and treatment, personally 
examine the patient, determine the diagnosis and course of treatment, perform 
physician services “or supervise the treatment to assure that appropriate 
services are provided by interns, residents or others . . . .”44  IL 372 also 
indicated that a teaching physician’s services to Medicare patients should be 
“of the same character, in terms of the responsibilities to the patient that are 
assumed and fulfilled, as the services he renders to his other paying patients” 
to qualify for Medicare Part B reimbursement. 45 
In 1970, HHS issued additional instructions to carriers through 
Intermediary Letter 70-2 (“IL 70-2”).46  IL 70-2 informed carriers that they 
may presume that a physician rendering inpatient services personally examined 
a patient if the physician’s signature appeared in the patient file: 
If the physician countersigned the entries in the record pertaining to the 
patient’s history and the record of examinations and tests, it would be 
presumed the physician personally examined the patient and determined the 
course of treatment to be followed.  Frequent reviews of the patient’s progress 
by the physician would be established by the appearance in the record of the 
physician’s signed notes and/or countersignature to notes with sufficient 
regularity that it could be reasonably concluded that he was personally 
responsible for the patient’s care.47 
In 1980, Congress enacted a statute which closely tracked IL 372’s 
language, specifying that a carrier should not pay for teaching physicians’ 
services unless the physicians “render[] sufficient personal and identifiable 
physicians’ services to the patient to exercise full, personal control over the 
management of the portion of the case for which the payment is sought.”48  
The legislative history accompanying this statute indicated that the House 
Budget Committee “strongly believes teaching physicians should personally 
perform or personally supervise patient services in order to qualify for fee-for-
 
 43. See IL 372, Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH) ¶ 3459.33, at 1289-11. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. U. S. Dep’t of Health and Human Services, Intermediary Letter No. 70-2, (Jan. 1970) 
[hereinafter IL 70-2], reprinted in Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH) ¶ 26,076, at 9188 (1970). 
 47. Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH) ¶ 26,076, at 9193.  See also AAMC Complaint, 
supra note 10, ¶ 28. 
 48. 42 U.S.C. § 1395u(b)(7)(A)(i)(I) (1994 & Supp. III 1997).  According to the AAMC 
Complaint, supra note 10, Congress enacted this statute to “incorporate the medical direction 
standard set forth in [42 C.F.R.] § 405.521 . . . .”  AAMC Complaint, supra note 10, ¶ 30. 
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service payment.”49  In 1982, when enacting legislation requiring Medicare to 
promulgate regulations regarding reimbursement of physician services under 
Part B, the Senate Finance Committee stated that physician services to hospital 
inpatients were reimbursable “only if such services are identifiable 
professional services to patients that require performance by physicians in 
person . . . .”50 
In 1986, the General Accounting Office (“GAO”) reviewed the 
requirements for Medicare Part B reimbursement by teaching physicians.51  
The GAO concluded that Medicare Part B reimbursement “required 
documentation in a patient’s medical records that the teaching physician either 
personally provided the service or was present when the service was provided 
by a resident.”52  The GAO also found that HCFA previously had failed to 
adequately communicate these documentation requirements to providers.53  At 
that time, the GAO recommended that HCFA “establish and enforce explicit 
documentation requirements” to clarify the matter for teaching physicians and 
hospitals.54 On December 30, 1992, all regional Medicare administrators were 
informed that physicians’ fees “are payable in teaching hospitals if . . . the 
physician personally performs an identifiable service . . . [or] the physician is 
physically present when the resident performs an identifiable supervised for 
which payment is sought.”55  The crucial question is to what extent Medicare 
administrators communicated this clarification to teaching physicians at 
academic medical centers. 
On December 8, 1995—nine years later—national rules were finalized.56  
These rules limited Medicare Part B reimbursement to teaching physicians 
who “medically directed resident services for which the teaching physician 
was physically present with the resident during key portions of the billed 
service.”57  Further, the rules stated that the patient file must reflect the 
 
 49. H. R. REP. NO. 96-1167, at 70 (1980). 
 50. S. REP. NO. 97-494, VOL. 1, at 22 (1982). 
 51. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REP. NO. HRD-86-36, DOCUMENTING TEACHING 
PHYSICIAN SERVICES STILL A PROBLEM (1986) 20 [hereinafter GAO, DOCUMENTING SERVICES]. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 21-22, 32 (observing that HCFA’s instructions were not “explicit” or “clear 
enough”). 
 54. Id. at 32. 
 55. Letter from Charles R. Booth, Director Office of Payment Policy, United States 
Department of Health and Human Services, to All Associate Regional Administrators for 
Medicare, December 30, 1992 [hereinafter Booth Letter]. 
 56. See GAO CONCERNS WITH PATH, supra note 2, at 10 (acknowledging a ten year gap 
between its 1986 report and HCFA’s resulting rules).  These regulations are currently at 42 
C.F.R. § 415.172 (1998). 
 57. See 42 C.F.R. § 415.172(b) (1998). 
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teaching physician’s physical presence at the time the service was furnished.58  
To provide teaching physicians and hospitals with timely notice and an 
opportunity to bring practices into compliance, the 1995 regulations were not 
made effective until July 1, 1996.59  Prior to July 1, 1996, HCFA issued a 
number of communications, generally to carriers, but also published in the 
Federal Register and Code of Federal Regulations60 which, according to a 1998 
GAO Report, “appear to have contributed to confusion over Medicare’s 
enforcement policy.”61  In particular, the 1991-1996 version of HCFA Form 
1500, the claim form submitted by physicians to obtain reimbursement under 
Part B, appeared to permit reimbursement to teaching physicians who 
supervised residents without requiring that the teaching physicians be 
physically present at the time the services were rendered.62  Form 1500 
provided: 
I certify that the services shown on this form were medically indicated and 
necessary for the health of the patient and were personally furnished by me or 
were furnished incident to my professional service by my employee under my 
immediate supervision, except as otherwise expressly permitted by Medicare 
or [Civilian Health and Medical Program for the Uniformed Services] 
CHAMPUS regulations.63 
As can be seen from the above review, over a thirty year time period some 
official pronouncements have required teaching physicians to be physically 
present when a resident rendered service (1966 regulations, 1982 legislative 
history, 1996 regulations)64 while other pronouncements have required only 
that a teaching physician “provide direction” or “supervise” the resident who 
rendered the service (1967 regulations, 1969 “IL 372” to carriers and 
 
 58. Id.  The AAMC believed that this new physical presence requirement went beyond the 
countersignature requirements of IL 372 and IL 70.  See AAMC Complaint, supra note 10, ¶ 36. 
 59. See 60 Fed. Reg. 63,124, 63,142-43. 
 60. This information included the Booth Letter, supra note 55, and a 1995 letter from the 
Director of HCFA’s Bureau of Policy Development. See GAO, CONCERNS WITH PATH, supra 
note 2, at 10.  Additionally, HCFA acknowledged “wide variations and lack of consistency” in 
regulations and program standards, see AAMC Complaint, supra note 10, ¶ 32 (citing 54 Fed. 
Reg. 5948 (1989)), while later indicating that the original 1967 regulations and IL 372 could 
provide guidance for those seeking “a more detailed explanation of attending physician criteria.” 
Id. ¶ 33 (citing 56 Fed. Reg. 59,507 (1991) (republishing 42 C.F.R. § 405.521 which set forth the 
“original requirements in a revised format”)). 
 61. GAO, CONCERNS WITH PATH, supra note 2, at 10. 
 62. See AAMC Complaint, supra note 10, ¶ 48. 
 63. Id.  HHS argues that because residents are not “employees” of the teaching physician, 
Form 1500 in no way permits reimbursement to teaching physicians who are not present when 
services are rendered to patients.  Draft Comments by and Electronic Mail Communications with 
Lewis Morris, Assistant Inspector General for Legal Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human 
Services (various dates in Fall, 1999). 
 64. See supra notes 37, 50, 57-59 and accompanying text. 
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intermediaries, 1970 “IL 70-2” to carriers and intermediaries, 1980 legislation, 
1991 HCFA claim form).65  It is little wonder that the GAO concluded, in 1986 
and again in 1998, that the physical presence requirement for teaching 
physicians has not been “clearly communicated or consistently enforced.”66  
Interestingly, in a 1997 letter to the President and Executive Vice President of 
the Association of American Medical Colleges (“AAMC”), the General 
Counsel of HHS acknowledged that “the standards for paying teaching 
physicians under Part B of Medicare have not been consistently and clearly 
articulated by HCFA over a period of decades.”67 
C. The PATH Audit Protocol 
When the OIG announced the PATH audit protocol for reviewing 
Medicare Part B billings by teaching physicians, they selected all teaching 
physicians at the 125 hospitals associated with U.S. medical schools for 
potential audits.68  The OIG selected these facilities because “of the nation’s 
1,200 teaching hospitals, these institutions had the greatest number of residents 
and received the most Medicare revenue.”69  As of November, 1999, PATH 
audits were planned, completed or underway for thirty of these institutions.70 
The audit protocol, whether under PATH I or II,71 requires review of one 
hundred randomly selected inpatient admissions during a selected one-year 
period between 1994-1995.72  Projections are made from these findings to all 
physician billings submitted by the physicians during the established period 
within the six-year statute of limitations time period set forth in the False 
Claims Act.73  Teaching hospitals argue that this protocol permits claims by a 
 
 65. See supra notes 38-48, 60-63 and accompanying text. 
 66. Id. at 11.  See also GAO, DOCUMENTING SERVICES, supra note 51, at 32 (noting that 
“HCFA’s current [as of 1986] requirements . . . are not explicit enough” and that “enforce[ment] 
var[ies] substantially among carriers”). 
 67. Rabb Letter, supra note 10, at 4.  The General Counsel also found that some carriers had 
communicated billing requirements clearly and thus communicated that OIG would undertake 
PATH audits only where carriers issued clear explanations of the reimbursement rules.  Id. at 5. 
 68. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text. 
 69. GAO, CONCERNS WITH PATH, supra note 2, at 12. 
 70. Id. 
 71. See supra text accompanying notes 24-27. 
 72. See Brief for Appellant, Ass’n of Amer. Med. Colleges v. United States, No. 98-56190 
(9th Cir. filed Nov. 9, 1998) (visited Jan. 18, 2000) <http://www.aamc.org/hlthcare/path/amc 
brief.txt>. 
Typically, 100 inpatient admissions yields between 1500 and 2500 occasions of physician 
service which have been provided by a small percentage of the faculty members.  By way 
of comparison, . . . University of Michigan faculty files an average of 350,000 claims 
annually.  Thus, the total audit sample is less than ½ of one percent of the total claims 
filed for a single year. 
Id. at 17 n.7. 
 73. 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (1994); see infra Part II.C. 
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few physicians to be the only claims reviewed and their billing errors, if any, to 
be projected to other physicians not included in the audit sample.  Teaching 
hospitals further complain that the OIG auditing protocol does not permit the 
physicians whose claims are identified as problematic, or the teaching hospital 
which employs these physicians, to rebut the conclusion of wrongdoing.74  
OIG, on the other hand, maintains that “physicians are part of the audit process 
and have ample opportunities to bring up issue and provide additional 
evidence.”75 
At the outset of each PATH audit, the auditors tell teaching hospitals that 
the alternative to PATH I or PATH II audit participation is litigation under the 
FCA.76  Penalties could be substantial, since the FCA mandates treble damages 
and mandatory penalties of $5,000 - $10,000 per claim.77  As the AAMC 
notes: “The potential liability . . . is hundreds of millions of dollars for any 
faculty that averages 100,000 Medicare claims annually and experiences an 
error rate of even two percent . . . .”78  The AAMC and the various teaching 
hospitals which filed suit for injunctive relief against the enforcement of PATH 
have argued that, given the possibility of severe penalties under the FCA, 
teaching hospitals have no choice but to settle.79  Despite the teaching 
hospitals’ arguments regarding the audit protocol, the GAO concluded that the 
OIG “followed a reasonable methodology” in conducting the audits, with one 
significant exception.80  Rather than undertaking audits of all one hundred and 
twenty-five teaching hospitals affiliated with the nation’s medical schools, the 
GAO concluded that OIG should have “identified institutions with suspected 
billing problems and then targeted its efforts accordingly.”81 
 
 74. AAMC Complaint, supra note 10, ¶ 62. 
 75. Draft Comments by and Electronic Mail Communications with Lewis Morris, Assistant 
Inspector General for Legal Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Services  (various dates in 
Fall, 1999). 
 76. AAMC Complaint, supra note 10, ¶ 57. 
 77. The False Claims Act (“FCA”) requires proof of “knowing” submission of false claims, 
which includes reckless disregard of the truth and deliberate indifference to the truth.  31 U.S.C. 
§ 3729(b) (1994). 
 78. AAMC Complaint, supra note 10, ¶ 57. 
 79. As the AAMC asserts: 
The fiduciary responsibility the Trustees and managers of the [teaching] universities, 
hospitals and faculties have to their communities, their institutions, and the patients served 
by their teaching and patient care programs, make them particularly susceptible to 
coercion when financial risk of such magnitude is threatened, whether directly or 
impliedly. 
Id. 
 80. See GAO, CONCERNS WITH PATH, supra note 2, at 23. 
 81. Id.  The GAO explained that “[b]ecause PATH audits can be time-consuming and 
expensive for both the government and the institutions, we believe that the OIG should have had 
a sound basis for asking the institutions to incur these costs.”  See also GAO Confirms Legal 
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As already noted, teaching hospitals have felt compelled to settle a PATH 
audit rather than contest its findings or protocol due to their belief that failure 
to settle will lead to suit under the False Claims Act (“FCA”).82  With its 
statutorily mandated damages and penalties, the FCA is an intimidating cause 
of action.  Yet, it is only one of numerous statutes available to the government 
for pursuing health care fraud.  As Part II of this article discusses, liability 
under the FCA may be mild compared to other sanctions available to pursue 
fraudulent health care providers.  It is the full arsenal, the FCA coupled with 
criminal and administrative sanctions and massive resources, that is truly 
intimidating. 
II.  RESOURCES AND SANCTIONS AIMED AT HEALTH CARE FRAUD 
A. The Resources 
Government resources available to combat health care fraud are 
formidable: far-reaching criminal statutes; civil causes of action which carry 
hefty, mandatory damages and penalties; forfeiture of assets; and 
administrative penalties of suspension and exclusion, which may be the “death 
penalty” for health care providers.  Almost annually for the past decade, 
Congress has passed stricter laws aimed at health care fraud.83  Most recently, 
with the passage of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
(“HIPAA”)84 in 1996 and the passage of the Balanced Budget Act85 in 1997, 
Congress substantially broadened the federal government’s statutory authority 
to prosecute health care fraud.  The new laws added five new health care 
crimes, most of which carry stiff penalties and mandatory forfeiture of assets;86 
expand the reach of federal crimes targeted at health care fraud to include fraud 
upon private health care insurers;87 and broaden HHS’s authority to impose 
 
Basis for PATH, But Raises Questions About IG’s Audits, 7 Health L. Rep. (BNA) 1292 (Aug. 13 
1998). 
 82. See supra text accompanying notes 76-79. 
 83. For example, note Congress’ attention to the anti-kickback statute.  First passed in 1971 
as a misdemeanor offense, see Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 242(b), 86 Stat. 1329 (1972), Congress 
amended the statute in 1977, see Pub. L. No. 95-142, 91 Stat. 1175 (1977), strengthening its 
provisions and making violation of it a felony. 
 84. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 
1936 (1996) [hereinafter HIPAA]. 
 85. Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Title IV-Medicare, Medicaid and Children’s Health 
Provisions, Pub. L. No. 105-33, 111 Stat. 251 (1997). 
 86. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 669 (Supp. III 1997) (theft involving health care programs); 18 
U.S.C. § 1035 (Supp. III 1997) (false statements involving health care programs); 18 U.S.C. § 
1518 (Supp. III 1997) (obstructing a health care criminal investigation); and 18 U.S.C. § 1347 
(Supp. III 1997) (health care fraud). 
 87. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 669, 1035, 1347. 
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civil monetary damages88 and exclusion.89  Perhaps most significantly, HIPAA 
appropriated substantial monies for investigations of health care fraud and 
established a self-funding trust to finance future health care fraud 
investigations.90  Under HIPAA, criminal fines and forfeitures in cases 
involving a “federal health care offense,” civil monetary penalties imposed in 
health care cases, and penalties and damages recovered under the FCA in 
health care cases are to be deposited into the trust fund.91  In 1998, the trust 
fund’s second year of operation, federal and state governments collected $296 
million from anti-fraud actions in health care cases.92  Of this amount, $119.6 
 
 88. Pub. L. No. 105-33, § 4304, 111 Stat. at 383-84 (1997) (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(a) (1994 & Supp. III 1997)). 
 89. HIPAA § 211, 110 Stat. at 2003-04 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(a)-(b) 
(1994 & Supp. III 1997)). 
 90. HIPAA § 201(b), 110 Stat. at 1993 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395i (1994 & 
Supp. III 1997)) (establishing a “Health Care Fraud and Abuse Control Account” expenditure in 
the Federal Hospital Insurance Trust Fund). 
 91. HIPAA § 201(b)(2)(C), 110 Stat. at 1993-94. 
 92.  
Total Transfer/Deposits by Recipient 1998 
Department of the Treasury  
HIPAA Deposits to the Medicare Trust Fund  
Gifts and Bequests $3,000.00 
Amount Equal to Criminal Fines $2,503,298.00 
Civil Monetary Penalties $1,855,277.00 
Amount Equal to Asset Forfeiture * $0.00 
Amount Equal to Penalties and Multiple Damages $103,025,990.00 
Health Care Financing Administration $27,998,956.00 
OIG Audit Disallowances - Recovered $144,741,634.00 
Restitution/Compensatory Damages $280,128,155.00 
Restitution/Compensatory Damages to Other Federal Agencies $7,488,888.00 
Department of Defense $173,866.00 
Office of Personnel Management $3,125,418.00 
Other $1,270,196.00 
 
Department of Health and Human Services - Other than HCFA 
 
  $12,058,368.00 
Relators’ Payments ** 4,344,610.00 
TOTAL * $296,531,133.00 
 
* This includes only forfeitures under 18 U.S.C. § 1347, a new federal health care fraud 
offense that became effective on August 21, 1996.  Not included are forfeitures obtained in 
numerous health care fraud cases prosecuted under federal mail and wire fraud and other 
offenses. 
** These are funds awarded to private persons who file suits on behalf of the Federal 
Government under the qui tam provisions of the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b) (1994). 
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million was appropriated from the fund for health care fraud investigations 
conducted by HHS/OIG.93 
The full impact of these increased resources is just beginning to be felt.  
The Inspector General’s Office of HHS currently employs a medical fraud staff 
of 1,143, up one-third from 1996.94  Department of Justice attorneys and FBI 
Agents devoted to health care fraud matters have increased by 175% since 
1993.95  Since 1993, fighting health care fraud has been a top priority of the 
U.S. Department of Justice.96  Law enforcement’s focus on health care fraud 
has borne fruit.  In the two years between 1995 and 1997, for example, 
criminal health care investigations increased 21.6%,97 criminal health care 
fraud prosecutions filed increased 23%,98 criminal health care fraud 
convictions increased 37%,99 and pending civil matters brought under the False 
Claims Act increased 185%.100  Since 1986, the DOJ has recovered $1.8 billion 
from matters involving health care fraud,101 with $1.2 billion collected in fiscal 
year 1997 alone.102 
B. Statutes Directed at Criminal Acts of Health Care Fraud 
Over thirty federal statutes are directed at criminal health care fraud or are 
applicable and routinely used to prosecute health care fraud.103  The penalties 
imposed by most of these statutes include possible maximum terms of prison 
of five years, and maximum fines of $250,000,104 although a few statutes carry 
 
*** Funds are also collected on behalf of state Medicaid programs and private insurance 
companies; these funds are not represented here. 
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS. & DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HEALTH CARE FRAUD AND 
ABUSE PROGRAM, ANNUAL REPORT FOR FY 1998 5-6 (1999) [hereinafter HHS & DOJ FRAUD 
REPORT FY 1998] (visited Jan. 18, 2000) <http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/98hipaa_ar.htm>. Cited page 
numbers correspond to pagination of this internet source. 
 93. Id. at 7. 
 94. Health Care Waste, Fraud and Abuse: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health of the 
House Comm. on Ways and Means, 105th Cong. at 58 (1997). 
 95. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, HEALTH CARE FRAUD REPORT  1997 13 (1998) [hereinafter 
DOJ FRAUD REPORT FY 1997] (visited Jan. 18, 2000) <http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/health97. 
html> (from 200 in 1993 to 551 in 1997).  Cited page numbers correspond to pagination of this 
internet source. 
 96. Id. at 2. 
 97. Id. at 10 (from 1,247 in 1995 to 1,517 in 1997). 
 98. Id. (from 229 in 1995 to 282 in 1997). 
 99. Id. (from 158 in 1995 to 217 in 1997). 
 100. DOJ FRAUD REPORT FY 1997, supra note 95, at 10 (from 1,406 in 1995 to 4,010 in 
1997). 
 101. Id. at 6. 
 102. Id. at 7. 
 103. BUCY, HEALTH CARE FRAUD, supra note 3, § 3.01. 
 104. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 286, 287, 371, 1341, 1343, 1505, 1622 (1994); 18 U.S.C. §§ 641, 
1001, 1503, 1512 (1994 & Supp. III 1997); 18 U.S.C. § 1518 (Supp. III 1997). 
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maximum prison terms of twenty years,105 even life imprisonment.106  
Although mandatory forfeiture of property which “constitutes or is derived 
from” fraud has been required in limited instances for years,107 mandatory 
forfeiture authority in instances of health care fraud was expanded in 1996 
with passage of HIPAA.108  HIPAA also added five additional crimes directed 
at health care fraud.109 
In addition to federal statutes and resources, the states aggressively 
prosecute health care fraud, usually extending their investigations to include 
instances of patient physical abuse.  In 1977, Congress passed legislation 
establishing Medicaid Fraud Control Units (“MFCUs”).110  In 1983, Congress 
made MFCUs mandatory.111  Most MFCUs are part of a state’s Attorney 
General’s office or other law enforcement office and are staffed with attorneys, 
investigators and auditors trained in health care and complex cases.112  
Currently, MFCUs have a combined staff of over 1,275 and a joint 
federal/state budget of $95 million.113 
As noted throughout this section, proof of intent to commit fraud, stated in 
a variety of ways, is an element of every criminal offense.  Ambiguous billing 
regulations not only make it difficult to determine whether improper bills were 
submitted, but also make it difficult to prove the requisite intent to defraud. 
 
 105. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956, 1961 (1994 & Supp. III 1997); 18 U.S.C. § 1347 (Supp. III 
1997). 
 106. 18 U.S.C. § 1347 (Supp. III 1997) (“if the violation results in death”). 
 107. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §1957 (1994); 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956, 1961 (1994 & Supp. III 1997). 
 108. See HIPAA § 249(a), 110 Stat. at 2020 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 982(a) (1994 
& Supp. III 1997)). 
 109. See supra note 86. 
 110. Medicare-Medicaid Anti-Fraud and Abuse Amendments, Pub. L. No. 95-142, § 1, 91 
Stat. 1201 (currently codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(g) (1994 & Supp. III 1997)). 
 111. Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13625, 107 Stat. 636 
(currently codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(g) (1994 & Supp. III 1997)).  A state may obtain a 
waiver of this requirement by demonstrating that it has a minimal amount of Medicaid fraud and 
that residents of facilities funded, in part, through Medicaid are protected against abuse and/or 
neglect.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a (61). 
 112. 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(q)(6) (1994 & Supp. III 1997). 
 113. The New York MFCU, with 280 employees, is the largest MFCU; Wyoming, with four 
employees, is the smallest MFCU.  Hearing on Health Care Fraud Before the Subcomm. on 
Oversight and Investigations of the House Commerce Comm., 106th Cong. (Nov. 9, 1999) 
(testimony of John Krayniak, Director, New Jersey Medicaid Fraud Control Unit). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
18 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 44:3 
1. Federal Crimes114 
a. Submitting False Claims: 18 U.S.C. § 287 
Although 18 U.S.C. § 287115 applies to any false claim made against the 
federal government, it is a common statute employed to prosecute health care 
fraud.  This statute was first passed in 1863;116 soon thereafter, it was separated 
into three statutes: the current § 287, a prior version of 18 U.S.C. § 1001117 and 
a prior version of the civil False Claims Act.118  The elements of § 287 are: (1) 
making or presenting a claim, (2) which is false, fictitious or fraudulent, (3) 
and material, (4) to a department or agency of the United States, (5) and, at the 
time the claim is made, the person presenting it knows it is false, fictitious or 
fraudulent.119  Medicare claims need not violate federal law to constitute a 
violation of § 287; it is sufficient if the claims violate guidelines set forth in the 
billing manual supplied by private insurance companies which contract with 
the federal government to process Medicare and Medicaid claims.120  Both § 
287 and the civil False Claims Act121 apply to almost every situation involving 
alleged false claims submitted to the federal government.  Because § 287 and 
the civil False Claims Act originated in the same legislation, they share many 
of the same elements and courts liberally apply precedent regarding one statute 
to the other.122  If physicians at teaching hospitals know that they are not to bill 
for patient services rendered by residents when the physician is not physically 
present, § 287 would be violated. 
 
 114. Portions of Part II.B.1-2 are based upon BUCY, HEALTH CARE FRAUD, supra note 3. 
 115. 18 U.S.C. § 287 (1994) provides: 
Whoever makes or presents to any person or officer in the civil, military or naval service 
of the United States, or to any department or agency thereof, any claim upon or against 
the United States, or any department or agency thereof, knowing such claim to be false, 
fictitious or fraudulent, shall be imprisoned not more than five years or shall be subject to 
a fine or both. 
 116. See Act of March 2, 1863, at ch. 67, 12 Stat. 696-99 (1863). 
 117. See discussion infra Part II.B.1.b. 
 118. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (1994). 
 119. See United States v. Medical Servs. Corp., 43 F. Supp.2d 499, 500 (D. Del. 1999). 
 120. Id. at 502. 
 121. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (1994).  See infra Part II.C.  For more information on the False 
Claims Act see JOHN  T. BOESE, CIVIL FALSE CLAIMS AND QUI TAM ACTIONS (1993 & Supp. 
1999) [hereinafter BOESE, CIVIL FALSE CLAIMS]; BUCY, HEALTH CARE FRAUD, supra note 3; 
SARAH N. WELLING, SARA SUN BEALE & PAMELA H. BUCY, FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW AND 
RELATED ACTIONS, ch. 27 (1998) [hereinafter WELLING, BEALE & BUCY, RELATED ACTIONS]. 
 122. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 540 n.2 (1943); United 
States v. Winchester, 407 F. Supp. 261 (D. Del. 1975). 
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b.   False Statements: 18 U.S.C. § 1001 
Although 18 U.S.C. § 1001 is a generic statute, prohibiting any type of 
false statement or concealment within the jurisdiction of the federal 
government, prosecutors have used § 1001 for many years to prosecute health 
care fraud.123  The elements of § 1001 are: (1) knowingly and willfully, (2) 
making a false, material statement or concealing a material fact or using a 
writing or document that is false in a material matter, (3) in any matter within 
the jurisdiction of any branch of the United States government.124 
Courts tend to interpret § 1001 broadly.  As the Fifth Circuit explained: 
“The false statement statute is necessarily couched in very broad terms to 
encompass the variety of deceptive practices which ingenious individuals 
might perpetrate upon an increasingly complex government.”125  For example, 
§ 1001 would be violated if a teaching physician at a teaching hospital who, 
knowing that he could not bill Medicare for patient services rendered by 
residents unless the teaching physician was present, submitted records falsely 
indicating that he was present when the resident rendered the services. 
c.   Mail Fraud and Wire Fraud: 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 1343 
Mail fraud,126 along with its “cousin,” wire fraud,127 is the most common 
statute used in the federal system to prosecute fraud, including health care 
 
 123. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994 & Supp. III 1997) provides, in pertinent part: 
Except as otherwise provided in this section, whoever, in any matter within the 
jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the Government of the 
United States, knowingly and willfully — 
(1) falsifies, conceals, or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact; 
(2) makes any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation; or 
(3) makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to contain any 
materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entry; 
shall be fined . . . or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both. 
 124. United States v. Capo, 791 F.2d 1054, 1068-69 (2d Cir. 1986), reh’g granted, 817 F.2d 
947 (1987). 
 125. United States v. Massey, 550 F.2d 300, 305 (5th Cir. 1977). 
 126. The mail fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1994), provides: 
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for 
obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or 
promises. . .for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice or attempting to do so, 
places in any post office or authorized depository for mail matter, any matter or thing 
whatever to be sent or delivered by the Postal Service, or deposits or causes to be 
deposited any matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by any private or 
commercial interstate carrier, or takes or receives, therefrom, any such matter or thing, or 
knowingly causes to be delivered by mail or by such carrier according to the direction 
thereon. . .any such matter or thing, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not 
more than five years, or both. 
 127. The wire fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1994), provides in pertinent part: 
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fraud.128  The elements of mail fraud are: (1) devising a scheme or artifice to 
defraud or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent 
pretenses, and (2) use of the mails in furtherance of the scheme.  There is no 
requirement of interstate use of the mails.129  The elements of wire fraud are: 
(1) devising a scheme or artifice to defraud or for obtaining money or property 
by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, and (2) interstate use of wire, radio 
or television communication.130  Courts interpret these statutes broadly.  As 
one court explained: “Because of the statutes’ broad, amorphous language, 
coupled with a lack of explanatory legislative history, courts have generally 
enjoyed considerable latitude in determining what types of schemes come 
within the purview of the statutes.”131 
If it can be proven that a teaching physician at an academic medical center 
knew that she could not bill Medicare for services provided to patients by 
residents when the teaching physician was not present, but submitted such bills 
anyway, mail fraud has been committed if the physician caused any item, 
which furthers this billing, to be sent through the U.S. mails, or by an interstate 
carrier such as Federal Express.  Wire fraud has been committed in this 
situation if the teaching physician used or caused to be used any interstate use 
of wire facilities, including telephone calls or faxes. 
The mail fraud and wire fraud statutes are powerful not only because of 
their broad scope, but also because they serve as “predicate acts” for even 
more powerful statutes, like RICO and money laundering. 
d.  Medicare and Medicaid Fraud: 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(a)(1) 
Making or causing false statements to be made to obtain payment from a 
federal health care program may be prosecuted as a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 
1320a-7b(a)(1).132  The elements of § 1320a-7b(a)(1) are: (1) knowingly and 
 
Whoever, having devised or intend to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for 
obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or 
promises, transmits or causes to be transmitted by means of wire, radio, or television 
communication interstate or foreign commerce, any writings, signs signals, pictures, or 
sounds for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice, shall [guilty of an offense]. 
 128. Enacted in 1872, the mail fraud statute is viewed as the “first line of defense” against 
fraud of all kinds. See Jed. S. Rakoff, Federal Mail Fraud Statute (Part I), 18 DUQ. L. REV. 771, 
772 (1979).  Prosecutors use the statute to prosecute consumer fraud, insurance fraud, public 
corruption, bank frauds, securities fraud and health care fraud. 
 129. 18 U.S.C. § 1341. 
 130. 18 U.S.C. § 1343. 
 131. See Medical Servs. Corp., 43 F. Supp.2d at 501. 
 132. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(a)(1) (1994 & Supp. III 1997) provides that: 
Whoever knowingly and willfully makes or causes to be made any false statement or 
presentation of a material fact in any application for any benefit or payment under a 
federal health care program . . . shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction thereof 
fined not more than $25,000 or imprisoned for not more than five years or both. 
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willfully, (2) making or causing to be made a false statement or representation 
of material fact, (3) in a claim for payment under the federal health care 
programs.133  Although § 1320a-7b(a)(1) specifically applies to false 
statements made to obtain payments from federal health care programs, 
prosecutors pursuing health care fraud are not limited to § 1320a-7b(a)(1) in 
such instances and still may proceed under generic fraud and false statement 
statutes.  Health care fraud in violation of § 287134 or § 1001135 would almost 
certainly be prosecutable under § 1320a-7b(a)(1). 
e. Money Laundering: 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956 and 1957 
Although most people think of money launderers as drug dealers, 
fraudulent health care providers, as well as any other white collar offender, 
may be prosecuted for money laundering.  There are two types of money 
laundering offenses: reporting offenses and “transportation” offenses.  
Reporting offenses penalize the failure to report cash transactions.136  
Transportation offenses forbid moving illegally obtained money into, out of, or 
among bank accounts, or moving legally obtained money among bank 
accounts to avoid tax or reporting obligations.137 
The reporting statutes include both civil and criminal penalties, while the 
transportation statutes only impose criminal liability.  Conviction under either 
the reporting or transportation statutes carries mandatory forfeiture of assets 
involved in the offense.138  Although money laundering statutes are lengthy 
and complex, prosecutors can fairly easily prove money laundering in any 
instance of fraud where the defendant uses the proceeds of the fraud to 
purchase goods or services or pay debts.139  For example, defendants in United 
 
 133. United States v. Laughlin, 26 F.3d 1523, 1526 (10th Cir. 1994). 
 134. See supra notes 115-22 and accompanying text. 
 135. See supra notes 123-25 and accompanying text. 
 136. 31 U.S.C. § 5313 (1994 & Supp. III 1997) requires a domestic financial institution 
involved in a cash transaction of $10,000 or more to file a report on the transaction.  31 U.S.C. § 
5324 (1994) prohibits structuring financial transactions (as in breaking the transactions into small 
transactions) for the purpose or evading reporting requirements.  Finally, 26 U.S.C. § 7203 (1994) 
expands the groups of persons who must report cash transactions, requiring “all persons engaged 
in a trade or business” to report cash transactions over $10,000.  31 U.S.C. § 5321 (1994 & Supp. 
III 1997) imposes a civil penalty for violations of § 5313, while 31 U.S.C. § 5322 (1994) imposes 
a criminal penalty of imprisonment for not more than five years, or a fine of not more than 
$250,000, or both, for willful violations of § 5313. 
 137. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956, 1957 (1994 & Supp. III 1997). 
 138. 18 U.S.C. § 982 (1994 & Supp. III 1997). 
 139. Excellent sources on money laundering include: United States Department of Justice, 
United States Attorney’s Manual § 9-105A.000 (Money Laundering Prosecution Manual); Money 
Laundering Law Report (Leader Publications); Symposium, The Anti-Money Laundering 
Statutes: Where From Here, 44 ALA. L. REV. 657 (1993); Sarah N. Welling, Smurfs, Money 
Laundering and the Federal Criminal Law, 41 FLA. L. REV. 287 (1989); G. Richard Strafer, 
Money Laundering: The Crime of the 90’s, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 149 (1989). 
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States v. Suba140 submitted false cost reports to Medicare on behalf of a home 
health care company, thereby obtaining reimbursement at a higher rate.141  The 
defendants were convicted of money laundering, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1956, 
because they invested the excessive reimbursement in stock, land and 
brokerage accounts and deposited the proceeds into company accounts from 
which they paid themselves.142  Section 1957, which does not contain the 
stiffer intent element of § 1956, is especially broad.  As the Ninth Circuit 
noted: “[Section 1957] is a powerful tool because it makes any dealing with a 
bank potentially a trap for . . . any . . . defendant who has a hoard of criminal 
cash derived from the specified crimes . . . .  This draconian law, so powerful 
by its elimination of criminal intent, freezes the proceeds of specific crimes out 
of the banking system.”143 
Thus, for example, if a teaching physician at an academic medical center 
engaged in mail fraud or wire fraud arising from reimbursement claims 
submitted to Medicare for treatment of Medicare patients by a resident when 
the teaching physician was not present, and the physician loaned a friend 
money which the teaching physician received as reimbursement from Medicare 
because of such claims, the physician has violated § 1956 if she made the 
loan144 with one of the following intents: (1) to promote the fraud scheme, (2) 
to engage in tax fraud or tax evasion, (3) to conceal the source of the funds, (4) 
to avoid a cash reporting requirement.  As one might imagine, it would be 
difficult to prove that the physician made the loan with one of the 
aforementioned intents, and thus difficult to prove a violation of § 1956. 
It would be easier to prove a violation of § 1957.  If a teaching physician at 
an academic medical center engaged in mail fraud or wire fraud arising form 
reimbursement claims submitted to Medicare for treatment of Medicare 
patients by a resident when the teaching physician was not present, and the 
physician deposited an amount greater than $10,000 of Medicare 
reimbursement into her bank account,145 the physician has violated § 1957.  
Although § 1957 carries a lighter term of imprisonment than § 1956 (ten versus 
twenty years), conviction of either offense requires mandatory forfeiture of 
property “involved in” or “traceable” to such an offense.146  Thus, the clinic or 
office at which the physician saw the patients at issue would be forfeited. 
 
 140. 132 F.2d 662 (11th Cir. 1998). 
 141. Id. at 666-67. 
 142. Id. at 666. 
 143. United States v. Rutgard, 108 F.3d 1014, 1062 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 144. A loan is a “financial transaction” within the meaning of § 1956.  See 18 U.S.C.  § 1956. 
 145. Which is a “monetary transaction” within the meaning of § 1957.  See 18 U.S.C. § 1957. 
 146. See supra notes 107-08 and accompanying text. 
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f. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (“RICO”): 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 1961-1964 
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (“RICO”), passed in 
1970,147 creates a criminal offense and a civil cause of action.148  The federal 
government serves as prosecutor if criminal liability is sought.149  The federal 
government, or any person injured in his or her business or property by the 
RICO violation, may serve as plaintiff and bring a civil RICO action.150  Most 
RICO cases are civil.151 
Regardless of whether the RICO case is civil or criminal or the plaintiff is 
the government or a private citizen, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant 
engaged in a “pattern of racketeering activity.”152  A variety of state crimes 
(murder, robbery, bribery, extortion, illegal drug dealing) and over sixty 
federal crimes (ranging from drug dealing and gambling to white collar 
offenses) constitute “racketeering activity.”153  The “pattern” of racketeering 
activity may be shown with proof that acts were related to each other through 
the “same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims or methods of 
commission;” that there was a threat of the acts continuing; or that the 
“offenses are part of an ongoing entity’s regular way of doing business.”154  
The RICO plaintiff must show that at least one of the following types of 
conduct took place and that such conduct affected interstate commerce: 
(1) the defendant invested in an “enterprise,” monies received through the 
pattern of racketeering activity; 
(2) the defendant acquired or maintained control of an “enterprise” through a 
pattern of racketeering activity; 
(3) the defendant, who was employed by or associated with an “enterprise,” 
conducted or participated in the affairs of the enterprise through a pattern of 
racketeering activity; or 
(4) the defendant conspired to do any of the above.155 
 
 147. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, § 901(a), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1964 (1994 & Supp. 
III 1997). 
 148. See WELLING, BEALE & BUCY, RELATED ACTIONS, supra note 121, at ch. 21.  Other 
excellent sources on RICO include PAUL A. BATISTA, CIVIL RICO PRACTICE  MANUAL (2d ed. 
1997) and KEVIN P. RODDY, RICO IN BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LITIGATION (1991). 
 149. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1994). 
 150. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(b) (1994). 
 151. U.S. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS, Table C-2, Civil Cases Commenced 
1994-1998; Table D-2, Criminal Cases Commenced 1994-1998. 
 152. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1994). 
 153. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1994 & Supp. III 1997). 
 154. H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 240-42 (1989). 
 155. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1994). 
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An “enterprise” includes “any individual, partnership, corporation, association 
or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact 
. . . .”156 
The penalties for violating RICO are formidable.  If convicted of a RICO 
violation, a defendant may be imprisoned for up to twenty years and shall 
forfeit any interest acquired or maintained in violation of RICO and any 
property derived from a RICO violation.157  If found civilly liable under RICO, 
a defendant faces mandatory treble damages, attorneys fees and costs.158  In 
addition, courts are given broad power “to prevent and restrain” RICO 
violations by ordering divesture of any interest in any enterprise, or by 
imposing “reasonable” restrictions on future activities of a person engaged in 
RICO violations.159 
Health care fraud prosecutors have used RICO to prosecute physicians 
who conspire with attorneys and patients to submit false claims to insurers,160 
physicians who dispense unnecessary prescriptions of controlled substances,161 
and physicians who conspire to submit false claims for medical services not 
rendered,162 among others.  Civilly, RICO has been used in a wide variety of 
instances: for example, by a home health care company suing the billing 
company which processed the company’s bills for “fraudulently submit[ting] 
claims for reimbursement on [its] behalf . . . to Medicare, Medicaid, and other 
third-party payor insurance companies;”163 by investors who purchased limited 
partnership interests in a Magnetic Resonance Imaging center and sued the 
sellers, alleging misrepresentations regarding ownership and leasing 
arrangements;164 by an insurance company against physicians who allegedly 
conspired to defraud the company;165 and by a physician against a hospital 
which terminated him as medical director.166 
Through careful pleading, a RICO offense under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) can 
be proven simply by showing that a teaching physician used his office or clinic 
(the “enterprise”) to engage in mail fraud or wire fraud (the “pattern of 
racketeering activity”) arising from submission of reimbursement claims to 
Medicare for treatment by residents of Medicare patients when the teaching 
 
 156. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1994). 
 157. 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1994). 
 158. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1994 & Supp. III 1997). 
 159. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (1994). 
 160. See, e.g., United States v. Console, 13 F.3d 641, 650 (3d Cir. 1993); United States v. 
Neely, 980 F.2d 1074, 1077 (2d Cir. 1992) (involving claims of fictitious automobile accidents). 
 161. See, e.g., United States v. Hughes, 895 F.2d 1135, 1138-39 (6th Cir. 1990). 
 162. See, e.g., United States v. Worthington, 698 F.2d 820, 821 (6th Cir. 1983). 
 163. VNA Plus, Inc. v. APRIA Healthcare Group, Inc., 29 F. Supp.2d. 1253, 1257 (D. Kan. 
1998). 
 164. Gubitosi v. Zegeye, 28 F. Supp.2d 298, 300-01 (E.D. Pa. 1998). 
 165. Zenith Ins. Co. v. Breslaw, 108 F.3d 205, 206 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 166. Khurana v. Innovative Health Care Sys., Inc., 130 F.3d 143, 146 (5th Cir. 1997). 
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physician was not physically present.  Under 18 U.S.C. § 1963, the office or 
clinic used by the physician would be subject to mandatory forfeiture. 
g. Conspiracy: 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 286 
Conspiracy is an agreement between two or more persons to commit an 
unlawful act.167  The essence of the conspiracy offense is the agreement itself, 
not acts taken in furtherance of the agreement.168  Conspiracy is a criminal 
offense when the object of the conspiracy is the commission of a crime.169  The 
crime of conspiracy arises from certain planning activities that precede the 
actual commission of crime.  Generally, three elements must be proven to 
show that a conspiracy exists: (1) an agreement between two or more persons 
to commit an illegal act, (2) an intent to commit the illegal act, (3) the 
commission of at least one overt act by one co-conspirator in furtherance of tile 
conspiracy.170 
Some conspiracy statutes are limited to certain agreements.  For example, 
the general federal conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. § 371, prohibits only 
conspiracies to commit an offense against the United States, either by agreeing 
to violate a federal criminal law or by agreeing to defraud the United States.171  
Another federal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 286, prohibits only conspiracies to submit 
false claims to the government.172 
Sections 371 and 286 are the federal conspiracy offenses used most often 
in health care fraud prosecutions.  Although the two offenses are similar, there 
are differences.  Section 286 proscribes only certain conspiracies against the 
United States, those involving efforts to obtain payment for false, fictitious or 
fraudulent claims.173  Section 371, in contrast, proscribes conspiracies to 
commit an offense against the United States or to defraud the United States.174  
Section 286 is punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of five years, 
while § 371 is punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of five years 
when the object of the conspiracy is a felony, but is a misdemeanor, punishable 
by a maximum term of imprisonment of one year when the underlying offense 
 
 167. United States v. Falcone, 311 U.S. 205, 210 (1940); Williamson v. United States, 207 
U.S. 425, 447 (1908). 
 168. Braverman v. United States, 317 U.S. 49, 53 (1942). 
 169. Conspiracy may be a civil cause of action when the object of the conspiracy is a tort and 
the conspiracy causes proximate damage to the plaintiff.  PAMELA H. BUCY, WHITE COLLAR 
CRIME: CASES AND MATERIALS 5 (2d ed. 1998). 
 170. United States v. Gold, 743 F.2d 800, 824 (11th Cir. 1984). 
 171. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1994); United States v. Minarik, 875 F.2d 1186, 1187 (6th Cir. 1989); 
United States v. Touhey, 867 F.2d 534, 536 (9th Cir. 1989). 
 172. See id.;  see also 18 U.S.C. § 286 (1994). 
 173. Id. 
 174. 18 U.S.C. § 371. 
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is a misdemeanor.175  Lastly, § 286 has no “overt act” requirement, while  
§ 371 retains such a requirement.176  Because of these differences, the 
prohibition against double jeopardy does not apply if the government chooses 
to prosecute a defendant under both § 286 and § 381.177 
h. Theft of Government Property: 18 U.S.C. § 641 
Most federal efforts to prosecute health care fraud as theft employ 18 
U.S.C. § 641.178  Because § 641 provides one of the few misdemeanor offenses 
in the federal system, it can be of unique assistance to defense counsel in 
negotiating a plea bargain with the prosecutor.179  Whereas a felony conviction 
may subject a licensed health care provider to licensure discipline (revocation, 
suspension, reprimand) a misdemeanor conviction may not.  Misdemeanor use 
of § 641 will be available more often in health care fraud cases than in other 
types of fraud.  With many types of fraud (defense fraud for example) each 
false statement involves a large sum of money.  By comparison, although the 
total amount of loss per fraud scheme may be large, health care fraud usually is 
committed in small dollar increments ($2 per claim form, for example).  This 
makes bringing a charge under the misdemeanor provision of § 641 a viable 
option in most health care cases. 
Section 641 will be violated every time § 287 or § 1001 are violated, and 
can be used interchangeably or in addition to such charges. 
 
 175. Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 286. 
 176. United States v. Lanier, 920 F.2d 887, 892-93 (11th Cir. 1991). 
 177. Id. at 893-94. 
 178. 18 U.S.C. § 641 (1994 & Supp. III 1997) provides: 
Whoever embezzles, steals, purloins . . . any record, voucher, money, or thing of value of 
the United Sates or of any department of agency thereof . . . [s]hall be fined under this 
title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; but if the value of such property does 
not exceed the sum of $1000, he shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more 
than one year, or both. 
The word value means “face, par, or market value, or cost price either wholesale or retail, 
whichever is greater.” 18 U.S.C.  § 641.  Other provisions of  § 641 prohibit converting property 
of the United States to one’s use or the use of another.  Further, § 641 prohibits receiving, 
concealing, or retaining property obtained in one of the proscribed ways.  Neither of these 
provisions apply to health care fraud as directly as the theft provision.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Marrero, 904 F.2d 251, 256 (5th Cir. 1990). 
 179. 18 U.S.C. § 1003 provides another misdemeanor applicable to some instances of health 
care fraud.  Section 1003 makes it a crime to “knowingly and fraudulently demand [or endeavor] 
to obtain any share or sum in the public stocks of the United States.”  When the amount obtained 
does not exceed $1000, the punishment for violating § 1003 is a misdemeanor.  Manocchio v. 
Kusserow, 961 F.2d 1539 (11th Cir. 1992). 
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i.   Obstruction of Justice and Perjury 
Counsel for defendants, targets, subjects, and witnesses should be aware of 
obstruction of justice and perjury statutes when advising clients during pretrial 
or trial stages of a case.  Given the breadth of these statutes, there may be a 
thin line between violating the law and performing proper attorney functions 
such as preparing a witness for cross-examination, advising a client not to 
volunteer information or to answer only when certain of the facts.180 
There are over twenty federal statutes addressing obstruction of justice and 
perjury.  The statutes most relevant in health care fraud cases are 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1503 (influencing or injuring an officer or juror); 18 U.S.C. § 1505 
(obstructing proceedings before departments, agencies and congressional 
committees); 18 U.S.C. § 1512 (tampering with a witness); and 18 U.S.C. § 
1622 (suborning perjury).  All of these offenses are felonies, punishable by 
maximum terms of imprisonment of five years.181  To protect client and 
counsel from an obstruction of justice prosecution, counsel should caution 
clients not to destroy evidence that is sought or may be sought in an 
investigation, and not to discuss issues under investigation since such 
discussions could be viewed as influencing a witness if the person is later 
called as a witness.  Counsel should ensure that giving advice to clients is not, 
and is not perceived as, obstructing justice. 
One obstruction of justice statute bears special attention.  “Obstruction of 
criminal investigations of health care offenses,” found at 18 U.S.C. § 1518, 
was created under HIPAA in 1996.182  This statute prohibits willfully 
attempting to or obstructing, misleading or delaying “the communication of 
information or records relating to a violation of a Federal health care 
offense.”183  Because of HIPAA’s integrated approach to health care fraud, a 
violation of § 1518 activates additional liability under money laundering and 
forfeiture statutes.  Pursuant to HIPAA’s amendment to the money laundering 
offense,184 § 1518 is a “specified unlawful activity,” subjecting those who 
obstruct health care fraud investigations to money laundering prosecutions if 
other elements of money laundering are met.185  This is significant since 
money laundering offenses subject offenders to especially lengthy sentences 
 
 180. See, e.g., United States v. Poppers, 635 F. Supp. 1034, 1036 (N.D. Ill. 1986). 
 181. 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (1994 & Supp. III 1997); 18 U.S.C. § 1505 (1994); 18 U.S.C. § 1512 
(1994 & Supp. III 1997); 18 U.S.C. § 1622 (1994).  However, 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c), regarding 
harassment of a witness, is a misdemeanor offense, and subjects the offender to a maximum term 
of one year imprisonment. 
 182. HIPAA § 245(a), 110 Stat. at 2017-18 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1518 (Supp. 
III 1997)). 
 183. Id. 
 184. 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (1994 & Supp. III 1997). 
 185. HIPAA § 246, 110 Stat. at 2018 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7)(F) 
(1994 & Supp. III 1997)). 
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under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.186  In addition, pursuant to HIPAA’s 
amendment to the criminal forfeiture provision found at 18 U.S.C. § 982, a 
conviction of obstructing a health care investigation subjects one to mandatory 
forfeiture of property which “constitutes or is derived, directly or indirectly, 
from gross proceeds traceable to the commission of the [§ 1518].”187 
j. Health Care Fraud: 18 U.S.C. § 1347 
Created by HIPAA, 18 U.S.C. § 1347 is modeled after the mail fraud and 
wire fraud statutes.188  Like the mail and wire fraud statutes, which cover fraud 
upon private victims, not just the government, 18 U.S.C. § 1347, through the 
definition of “health care benefit program,”189 covers fraud upon private payers 
as well as upon public insurers.  Although § 1347 requires an effect upon 
commerce,190 while the mail fraud and wire fraud statutes do not,191 it is 
broader than the mail fraud or wire fraud statutes in other ways.  Section 1347 
does not require a mailing or use of an interstate carrier as does the mail fraud 
offense,192 nor does it require use of interstate wire communications as does 
the wire fraud offense.193 
 
 186. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2S1.1 (1998); 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7)(F) 
(Supp. III 1997). 
 187. HIPAA § 249, 110 Stat. at 2020 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 982(a) (Supp. III 
1997)).  See also text accompanying note 108. 
 188. HIPAA § 242, 110 Stat. at 2016 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1347 (Supp. III 
1997)).  Section 1347  provides: 
Whoever knowingly and willfully executes, or attempts to execute, a scheme or artifice — 
(1) to defraud any health care benefit program; or 
(2) to obtain, by means of false or fraudulent pretense, representations, or promises, any 
of the money or property owned by, or under the custody or control of, any health care 
benefit program, in connection with the delivery of or payment for health care benefits, 
items or services, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or 
both.  If the violation results in serious bodily injury . . .  such person shall be fined under 
this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both; and if the violation results in 
death, such person shall be fined under this title, or imprisoned for any term of years or 
for life, or both. 
 189. The term “health care benefit program” means “any public or private plan or contract, 
affecting commerce, under which any medical benefit, item, or service is provided to any 
individual, and includes any individual or entity who is providing a medical benefit, item or 
service for which payment may be made under the plan or contract.”  HIPAA § 241(a), 110 Stat. 
at 2016 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 24 (Supp. III 1997)). 
 190. See id. 
 191. Although neither the mail fraud nor wire fraud statutes require an effect on interstate 
commerce as does § 1347, the mail fraud statute requires that items sent by private carrier must 
be sent or delivered by an interstate private carrier, and the wire fraud statute requires that the 
wire transmissions or signals be sent by an interstate carrier.  See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343. 
 192. See id.; 18 U.S.C. § 1341. 
 193. See supra note 188; 18 U.S.C. § 1343. 
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As with the other criminal offenses created by HIPAA, § 1347 is integrated 
into existing money laundering and forfeiture statutes as a “specified unlawful 
activity,” thereby qualifying those who violate § 1347 for prosecution as 
money launderers.194  As noted, conviction for money laundering subjects an 
offender to a substantially longer sentence than does conviction for fraud.195  
Also, pursuant to HIPAA’s amendment of the criminal forfeiture provision 
found at 18 U.S.C. § 982, conviction of § 1347 subjects one to mandatory 
forfeiture of any property which “constitutes or is derived, directly or 
indirectly, from gross proceeds traceable to the commission of the [§ 1347].”196 
k. Theft or Embezzlement in Connection with Health Care: 18 U.S.C. § 
669 
Created under HIPAA, 18 U.S.C. § 669 provides: 
Whoever knowingly and willfully embezzles, steals, or otherwise without 
authority converts to the use of any person other than the rightful owner, or 
intentionally misapplies any of the moneys, funds, securities, premiums, 
credits, property, or other assets of a health care benefit program, shall be fined 
under this title197 or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both; but if the 
value of such property does not exceed the sum of $100 the defendant shall be 
fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.198 
Although modeled after 18 U.S.C. § 641, which makes it a crime to embezzle, 
steal or convert property or a thing of value belonging to the United States, § 
669 exceeds the scope of § 641.  Through its reference to “health care benefit 
program,” § 669 covers fraud upon private insurers as well as upon 
governmental programs.199  Like § 641, however, § 669 provides a 
misdemeanor option for charging health care fraud.200  Thus, it could be an 
important option for defendants during plea negotiations. 
Like the other crimes created by HIPAA, § 669 is included as “specified 
unlawful activity,” subjecting those who violate it to prosecution for money 
laundering, which carries a stiffer prison sentence than do most fraud offenses.  
 
 194. HIPAA § 246, 110 Stat. at 2018 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7)(F) 
(Supp.  III 1997)). 
 195. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 186, § 2S1.1. 
 196. HIPAA § 249, 110 Stat. at 2020 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)).  See also 
text accompanying note 108. 
 197. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3571-3574. 
 198. See HIPAA § 243(a), 110 Stat. at 2017 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 669 (Supp. 
III 1997)). 
 199. For the definition of “health care benefit program” see supra note 189. 
 200. See 18 U.S.C. § 669.  “[I]f the value of such property does not exceed the sum of $100 
the defendant shall be fined . . . or imprisoned not more than a year, or both.” 
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Also, pursuant to HIPAA amending the forfeiture provisions,201 conviction of 
§ 669 subjects one to mandatory forfeiture of any “property . . . that constitutes 
or is derived . . . from gross proceeds traceable to commission of [§ 669].”202 
l. False Statements Relating to Health Care Matters: 18 U.S.C. § 1035 
Created by HIPAA, 18 U.S.C. § 1035 makes it a crime to make a false 
statement or conceal material facts in connection with the delivery or payment 
for health care benefits.203  Although modeled after 18 U.S.C. § 1001, which 
makes it an offense to make false and fraudulent statements to the federal 
government, 18 U.S.C. § 1035 has two notable differences from § 1001.  First, 
like all other new health care fraud crimes, § 1035 reaches fraud upon private 
as well as public insurers. Section 1001 is limited to fraud upon the federal 
government.204  Second, presumably because of the clarification given to the 
materiality element of § 1001 in recent court decisions,205 § 1035 (unlike § 
1001) clearly sets forth materiality as an element to be proven by the 
government.206 
Like the other crimes created by HIPAA, § 1035 is a “specified unlawful 
activity” subjecting those who commit it to money laundering prosecutions.207  
Also, pursuant to HIPAA’s amendment to the criminal forfeiture provision, a 
conviction of § 1035 subjects one to mandatory forfeiture of property which 
“constitutes or is derived, directly, from gross proceeds traceable to the 
commission of [§ 1035].”208 
 
 201. HIPAA § 249, 110 Stat. 2020 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 982(a) (Supp. III 
1997)).  See also text accompanying note 108. 
 202. Id. 
 203. 18 U.S.C. § 1035 (Supp. III 1997) provides: 
Whoever, in any matter involving a health care benefit program, knowingly and willfully 
– 
(1) falsifies, conceals, or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact; or 
(2) makes any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statements or representations, or 
makes or uses any materially false writing or document knowing the same to contain any 
materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entry, in connection with the 
delivery of or payment for health care benefits, items, or services, shall be fined . . . or 
imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both. 
 204. For the definition of “health care benefit program,” see supra note 189. 
 205. See, e.g., United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506 (1995). 
 206. See 18 U.S.C. § 1035(a)(2) (prohibiting the knowing and willful making of “any 
materially false of fictitious statement) (emphasis added). 
 207. See HIPAA § 246, 110 Stat. at 2018 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7)(F) 
(Supp. III 1997)). 
 208. See text accompanying note 108; HIPAA § 249, 110 Stat. at 2020 (codified as amended 
at 18 U.S.C. § 982(a) (Supp. III 1997)); see also BUCY, HEALTH CARE FRAUD, supra note 3, 
§ 3.02[15][c]. 
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m.   The Anti-kickback Statute: 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) 
The federal health care anti-kickback statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b), 
affects almost every business arrangement by and among health care providers.  
It is a criminal statute intended to prohibit inducements for patient referrals; 
violations are punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of five years.209  
Originally, the anti-kickback statute applied only to referrals “for an item or 
service for which payment may be made in whole or in part under [Medicare 
or Medicaid].”210  Effective January 1, 1997, however, the anti-kickback 
statute was expanded to reach violations related to items or services provided 
under all federal health care programs, notably health coverage for military 
personnel and their dependents through the Civilian Health and Medical 
Program for the Uniformed Services (“CHAMPUS”).211  In pertinent part, the 
anti-kickback statute prohibits any person from: 
(1) Knowingly and willfully soliciting or receiving “remuneration,” directly or 
indirectly, overtly or covertly, in return for a referral for program-reimbursable 
items or services; or 
(2) knowingly and willfully offering or giving “remuneration,” directly or 
indirectly, overtly or covertly, with the intent to induce referrals for program-
reimbursable items or services.212 
Controversy has surrounded the anti-kickback statute for several reasons.  
First, the statute prohibits what is a legitimate, if not valued, business tactic 
outside the health care field.  Providers argue that such conduct should not be 
criminalized.213  Second, court interpretations of the anti-kickback statute have 
lurched from expansive214 to restrictive,215 making it difficult for providers to 
conduct day-to-day business transactions without violating the statute.  Third, 
qui tam relators as well as the federal government have brought actions under 
the False Claims Act (FCA)216 alleging, as the falsity, violations of the anti-
 
 209. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (1994 & Supp. III 1997). 
 210. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (1994). 
 211. However, federal employee health benefit plans are not included as “federal health care 
programs.”  See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(f)(1) (1994 & Supp. III 1997). 
 212. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (1994 & Supp. III 1997). 
 213. See BUCY, HEALTH CARE FRAUD, supra note 3, § 2.13[1]. 
 214. See, e.g., United States v. Greber, 760 F.2d 68 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 988 
(1985) (stating that “if one purpose of the payment [between providers] was to induce future 
referrals, the Medicare statute has been violated.”) (emphasis added).  See also United States v. 
Kats, 871 F.2d 105 (9th Cir. 1989) (“material purpose”); United States v. Bay State Ambulance & 
Hosp. Rental Serv., Inc., 874 F.2d 20 (1st Cir. 1989) (“primary purpose”). 
 215. See, e.g., Hanlester Network v. Shalala, 51 F.3d 1390 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that the 
government must prove that a defendant acted with willful violation of a “known legal duty.”). 
 216. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (1994). 
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kickback statute.  Many health care providers view this coupling of the FCA 
and the anti-kickback statute as exceeding the scope of either statute.217 
n.   Retaining Overpayments: 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(3) 
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(3), it is a crime to conceal the fact that one 
may have received federal health care funds erroneously.  This statute 
provides: 
Whoever . . . having knowledge of the occurrence of any event affecting . . . 
his initial or continued right to any . . . benefit [under a Federal health care 
program] . . . conceals or fails to disclose such event with an intent 
fraudulently to secure such benefit or payment either in a greater amount or 
quantity than is due . . . shall . . . be guilty of a felony and upon conviction be 
fined not more than $25,000 or imprisoned for not more than five years or 
both.218 
The coverage of this statute is unclear, especially since there is no legislative 
history regarding it and no completed prosecutions to date under it.219  
However, its terms are broad. It appears to cover, for example, an instance 
where a provider learns that it was overpaid by Medicare because of incorrect 
billing codes accidentally submitted by the provider.  If the provider fails to 
come forward and reveal the overpayment, is the provider guilty under this 
statute?  Presumably so, for even if the funds originally were received through 
innocent mistake, once the provider decides to retain the overpayment, he has 
fraudulently retained the funds. 
2.  State Crimes 
a.  Conspiracy 
Conspiracy is a common charge in state prosecutions of health care 
fraud.220  In state prosecutions, as in federal prosecutions of health care fraud, 
the advantages for the government of the conspiracy charge are gaining 
admission of otherwise inadmissible hearsay221 and combining far-flung actors 
 
 217. Robert Fabrikant & Glenn E. Solomon, Application of the Federal False Claims Act to 
Regulatory Compliance Issues in the Healthcare Industry, 51 ALA. L. REV. 105, 106 (2000). 
 218. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(a)(3) (1994 & Supp. III 1997). 
 219. See Ronald J. Nessim, Health Care Disclosure Statute: What Does It Mean?, CRIM. 
JUST. 34-39 (Winter 1999). 
 220. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Askin, 452 A.2d 851 (Pa. Super. 1982), modified by 467 
A.2d 820 (1993); State v. Burnett, 556 A.2d 1251 (N.J. 1989); State v. Toscano, 378 A.2d 755 
(N.J. 1977); People v. Varas, 487 N.Y.S.2d 577 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985); State v. Poganski, 257 
N.W.2d 578 (Minn. 1977); State v. Lawrence, 212 S.E.2d 52 (S.C. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 
1025 (1975); People v. Marsh, 376 P.2d 300 (Cal. 1962); People v. Chapman, 24 Cal. Rptr. 568 
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1962). 
 221. See, e.g., Chapman, 24 Cal. Rptr. at 580. 
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and actions into one case.222  As in the federal courts, proof of the agreement 
may be by circumstantial evidence.223  At least some states require proof of 
specific intent to violate the law on the part of all conspirators.224 
b.  Medicaid Fraud 
Although historically most health care fraud prosecutions have been 
handled by federal prosecutors, states have been active in prosecuting health 
care fraud for twenty years through Medicaid Fraud Control Units 
(MFCUs).225  When state prosecutors bring charges against health care 
providers for fraud, they use a variety of statutes including Medicaid fraud, 
theft, larceny, obtaining money by false pretenses and forgery.226  Medicaid 
fraud is the most consistent charge employed by state prosecutors227 and a 
number of states have statutes specifically directed at Medicaid fraud.228 Most 
such statutes are of recent vintage and contain at least the following elements: 
prohibition of false statements and/or false claims; prohibition of kickbacks for 
referrals; a dual penalty track—misdemeanor punishment when larger amounts 
of money are involved; required access to provider’s records for governments 
fraud investigators; restitution; mandatory exclusion from the Medicaid 
program; and substantial civil penalties. 
Intent is the most heavily litigated issue under the Medicaid fraud statutes 
and the various state statutes’ intent language is considerably diverse.  Some 
Medicaid fraud statutes explicitly require proof of a high level of intent.  
Louisiana, for example, requires proof of “intent to defraud the state.”229  
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(Michie 1998); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:70.1 (West 1997 & Supp. 1999); MD. CODE ANN., 
HEALTH-GEN. I § 15-123 (1994 & Supp. 1998); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 400.601 (West 
1997); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-13-201 (1993); MO. REV. STAT. § 191.900-910 (West 1996); 
MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-6-111 (1999); NEV. REV. STAT. § 422.540 (1997); N.H. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 167:58; (1994 & Supp. 1998) N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4D-17 (West 1997); N.M. STAT. 
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 229. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:70.1 (West 1998 & Supp. 1999). 
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Louisiana courts hold that the statute’s intent requirement requires proof of 
“specific intent”: proof that the “offender must have actively desired the 
prescribed criminal consequence . . . .”230  Michigan, by comparison, requires 
proof that the defendant acted “knowing[ly].”231  Although Michigan courts 
claim that the statute’s language requires proof of “specific intent,” they appear 
to dilute any specific intent requirement.  For example, in People v. American 
Medical Centers of Michigan, Ltd.,232 the Michigan Court of Appeals held that 
“specific intent” may be shown with evidence that the defendant “was aware of 
his conduct and that his conduct was substantially certain to cause the intended 
result.”233 
c.  Anti-kickback Statutes 
A number of states have anti-kickback statutes,234 most of which are 
modeled after the federal anti-kickback statute.235  Some statutes include civil 
penalties and revocation of professional licenses as penalties.236  Prosecution 
under state anti-kickback statutes may become more common if, as recent 
court action indicates, the federal anti-kickback statute is interpreted as 
requiring strong proof of criminal intent before the federal statute is 
violated.237 
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 231. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 400.607(2) (West 1997). 
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 235. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-1-11(b),(c); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4D-17(c); VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 32.315(A), (B) (Michie 1997). 
 236. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-77-902(6),(7); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 61-6-15(D)(15),(E) 
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C.  Statutes Imposing Civil Liability for Health Care Fraud 
The False Claims Act (“FCA”), originally passed in 1863 and amended 
significantly since, is one of the most potent weapons available to the 
government to combat health care fraud.238  The FCA gives the federal 
government a cause of action for damages against those who file false claims 
with the federal government.239  What makes the FCA unusual, however, is 
that it also gives any “person” a cause of action against those who file false 
claims with the federal government.  This private plaintiff, known as the “qui 
tam” relator, does not have to demonstrate damage or harm to himself or 
herself to obtain standing.240  Rather, courts have held that the relator acquires 
standing through an assignment theory (the federal government as the harmed 
party assigns relators the opportunity to participate in the suit)241 or a personal 
stake theory (the relator has sufficient interest in the lawsuit because of the 
portion of the judgment or costs the relator may share).242 
The qui tam provision of the FCA is a “private attorney general” approach 
to law enforcement.243  By offering to share a portion of its recovery from a 
successful lawsuit with private parties, the FCA encourages those who know 
about fraud, or have the ability to learn about fraud, to come forward with 
information.  Such a rationale is well suited to fraud cases and especially well 
suited to health care fraud, which is complex and often known only to insiders.  
Industry insiders, whether employees or competitors, are in a position to see 
what the government is incapable of detecting or adequately investigating as an 
outsider.244  The decentralization of many businesses, the complexity of 
applicable regulations, the challenge of following the paper trail, the many 
individuals within a business who may participate, even unwittingly, in a 
fraud, make the knowledge and assistance of an insider almost essential to a 
successful fraud investigation, certainly to an efficient investigation.245 
Recognizing the value of an insider’s knowledge and the risk insiders often 
take when coming forward with information about a fraud, the FCA rewards 
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insiders well, allocating to relators up to 30% of the recovery in any FCA 
lawsuit.246  Since the FCA was amended in 1986, over 2,900 qui tam cases 
have been filed, with the number quickly increasing, from 33 cases in Fiscal 
Year (“FY”) 1987, for example, to 483 cases in FY 1999.247  Since 1987, total 
qui tam recoveries have exceeded $2.915 billion; the average relator’s share in 
qui tam cases where there has been a recovery is $1 million.248  The FCA has 
been used increasingly in health care cases by qui tam relators: in 1987, only 
12% of qui tam FCA cases involved HHS as the client agency; in 1998, 61% 
of qui tam FCA cases involved HHS as the client agency.249 
Because of its dual plaintiff system, the procedure followed in FCA cases 
is unique among all federal causes of action.  When a relator files an FCA 
complaint, the relator must file the complaint under seal and must furnish the 
U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) with a copy of the complaint and 
“substantially all material evidence and information” the relator possesses.250  
It is to the relator’s advantage to make a thorough, comprehensive, and 
persuasive statement of the case to the government in this submission, so as to 
persuade the government to join as plaintiff.  One study of all qui tam actions 
filed between 1986-1996 revealed that “the average recovery for qui tam cases 
where the government intervened [was] approximately $6 million whereas the 
average recovery for qui tam cases where the government declined to intervene 
was approximately $33,000.”251 
Although the FCA provides for a sixty-day sealing period,252 the seal is 
often extended for eighteen to twenty-four months.253  This sealing leaves the 
odd result that, for this entire time period, the defendant may remain unaware 
that it has been named in a lawsuit that could subject it to substantial financial 
penalties.254  During the time the complaint is sealed, and before the DOJ 
decides whether to join the lawsuit as a plaintiff, the DOJ may conduct 
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discovery: depositions, interrogatories, and requests for production of 
documents, all through Civil Investigative Demands (CIDs).255  A defendant 
may become aware that it has been named in an FCA lawsuit through CIDs or 
by virtue of a partial or full lifting of the seal, but this is not always true.256  
Even if a defendant becomes generally aware that it has been named in an FCA 
lawsuit, it will have no information as to the allegations or scope of the charges 
or the identity of the relator.257 
As can be seen, these aspects of an FCA case resemble a criminal case.  
Like an FCA defendant named in a sealed complaint, a criminal defendant may 
be the target of a grand jury investigation, even named in a sealed indictment, 
without knowing of his or her status.  Also by using CIDs, the government in 
an FCA case is able to conduct discovery unilaterally and secretly, if it 
chooses, prior to joining as plaintiff.  This process of unilateral discovery is 
similar to the grand jury process, in which the government conducts secret 
discovery prior to filing criminal charges. 
Perhaps the most unusual aspect of the FCA is its “jurisdictional bar” 
provision.258  To qualify as a qui tam relator, a private party must overcome 
this bar: 
No court shall have jurisdiction over an action . . . based upon the public 
disclosure of allegations or transactions in a criminal, civil, or administrative 
hearing, in a congressional, administrative, or Government Accounting Office 
report, hearing, audit or investigation, or from the news media, unless the 
action is brought by the Attorney General or the person bringing the action is 
an original source of the information.259 
Thus, if information regarding the allegations in the FCA lawsuit has 
become public before the relator files the complaint, the relator is 
jurisdictionally barred from proceeding with the lawsuit unless the relator can 
prove that he or she is the “original source” of the public disclosure.260  Even if 
the relator is jurisdictionally barred, the case may continue with the federal 
government as the only plaintiff.261  This provision advances the FCA’s goal: 
qui tam actions are to encourage knowledgeable persons to bring to the 
government’s attention instances of fraud against the government.  If the 
information is already public, this goal has been achieved.  However, to 
encourage relators to come forward and to provide information that is not yet 
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in the public domain, the FCA continues to reward those who can show that 
they were an original source of the publicity.262 
The jurisdictional bar provision substantially complicates an FCA case 
involving relators.  A relator must file his or her qui tam action prior to any 
public disclosure of the fraud, or if public disclosure occurs, the relator must be 
able to prove that her qui tam action is not based upon the public disclosure or 
if it is, that her or she was the “original source” of the disclosure.263  To prove 
that he or she is an original source, the relator must prove that he or she 
obtained the information regarding the false claims “directly and 
independently” and that he or she voluntarily provided such information to the 
government.264  Not only are these questions highly fact specific and thus 
difficult to predict, but the circuits are divided over the most basic questions of 
jurisdictional bar jurisprudence.265 
Failure to master the jurisdictional bar provision can be serious and prevent 
a relator from participating in an FCA action.  By the same token, failure to 
argue adequately that a case is jurisdictionally barred can spell disaster for a 
defendant when the relator is the only plaintiff in the FCA action (since the 
entire case must be dismissed otherwise) and for the government when it joins 
as plaintiff (and must share its recovery with a relator who otherwise would be 
removed from the case). 
Despite the complications the FCA poses for parties, especially relators, 
the FCA has had an enormous impact on health care fraud for several reasons.  
Among white collar cases, health care fraud stands out as complex to 
investigate.  The intricacy of applicable billing requirements, the sophistication 
necessary to evaluate medical procedures and services, and the large size and 
diffusion of duties common in many institutional health care providers make 
health care fraud especially difficult to detect and prove.266  Industry insiders, 
whether employees, competitors or business associates, are invaluable in 
finding and proving such fraud.  The FCA, with its large, statutory recoveries, 
and promise to share any recovery with relators, provides an incentive for 
insiders to come forward with information about fraud on Medicare and other 
government programs. 
In addition, the damage and penalty structure of the FCA delivers a 
formidable punch in health care cases, more so than in cases involving many 
other government programs.  The FCA provides for a judgment of treble 
damages, attorneys fees and costs, and a mandatory penalty of $5,000 - 
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$10,000 for each false claim.267  Because of the billing structure for most 
health care services (one claim per service, per patient) even a small health 
care provider will submit thousands of claims each year.  Thus, even if the 
amount of alleged fraud is a few cents per claim, rendering a minimal amount 
of treble damages, the mandatory penalties of a minimum of $5,000 per claim 
will be substantial.  Considering such substantial penalties the DOJ and HHS 
have been especially solicitous of qui tam relators.  As the DOJ noted: 
“Overall, the FCA has powerful and far reaching effects . . . .  Qui tam . . . suits 
have dramatically increased detection of and monetary recoveries for health 
care fraud.”268 
The FCA has been employed in the PATH initiative.  Teaching hospitals 
selected for audits allegedly have been told that if they choose not to 
participate in the audit, the “alternative is litigation under the FCA.”269  The 
teaching hospitals refer to the looming prospect of FCA liability as a “coercive 
power . . . to extract ‘settlements’. . . .”270  In addition to any the FCA, of 
course, is criminal liability under any number of the offenses outlined in Part 
II.B of this article and the administrative sanctions set forth below. 
D. Statutes Providing Administrative Sanctions for Health Care Fraud 
Health care providers who are found to have committed fraud, after a 
criminal conviction, a finding of civil liability, or an independent finding by an 
Administrative Law Judge of the Department of Health and Human Services, 
are subject to a variety of administrative sanctions271 including assessment of 
penalties or exclusion from participating in Medicare and state health care 
programs.272  Providers are subject to civil monetary penalties levied 
administratively by HHS of up to $10,000 ($100,000 in some instances) for 
each improper claim submitted to Medicare or state health care programs.273  
Exclusion is often referred to as the “death penalty” for providers because 
excluded providers cannot bill Medicare, Medicaid or any state health care 
program for services.  For most providers, exclusion closes them down.  
Liability under the FCA during a PATH audit could subject a teaching hospital 
and any of its offending physicians to both exclusion and penalties. 
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Although exclusion is catastrophic, suspension can be worse.  At least with 
exclusion and assessment of administrative penalties, procedures are in place 
for providers to obtain a hearing and an appeal.274  However, carriers are also 
authorized to suspend future payments to the provider immediately and 
without a hearing whenever a provider has been apparently overpaid because 
of the filing of false claims or otherwise.275 
In addition to the above sanctions, a provider found to have submitted false 
claims for reimbursement (either to public or private insurers) is subject to 
orders to make restitution,276 revocation of his or her professional license, loss 
of staff privileges at hospitals,277 and loss of his or her license to prescribe 
certain medications.278 
III.  CONSIDERATION OF CULTURAL AND ECONOMIC IMPACT 
There is a large, aggressive law enforcement machine poised to pursue 
health care fraud.  Supplied with ample resources and powerful statutory 
weapons including criminal statutes carrying twenty-year terms of 
imprisonment and mandatory forfeiture, the FCA with its huge, statutorily set 
monetary awards, and administrative sanctions that can demolish a health care 
provider. 
Many businesses operate on such a thin margin that any disruption erodes 
their profitability, if not viability.  Academic medical centers are especially 
vulnerable to disruptions due to recent changes in the health care industry.  
Before examining the general state of academic medical centers and how the 
PATH audit, or any large scale investigation, disrupts their existence, it may be 
helpful to review the PATH audit experience of one academic medical center. 
The Dartmouth-Hitchcock Medical Center (“Dartmouth”) underwent a 
PATH audit despite the fact that the OIG had no indication that Dartmouth 
physicians were improperly billing Medicare.  In fact, the U.S. Department of 
Justice official credited with creating the PATH initiative viewed Dartmouth’s 
billing guidance for teaching physicians as “the best he had ever seen.”279  
Once informed that it was selected for a PATH audit, Dartmouth opted for 
 
 274. 42 C.F.R. §§ 1001.2001 to 1001.2007 (1998). 
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PATH II, thereby conducting the audit itself, pursuant to OIG guidelines.280  
After approximately ten months, when about half of the sampled admissions 
had been reviewed, OIG terminated the audit, finding no billing errors.281  By 
that time, Dartmouth had spent approximately $1.7 million in conducting the 
partial audit: $600,000 in audit expenses, $300,000 in legal fees and other 
costs, and $800,000 in indirect costs attributable to a delay in obtaining bond 
financing.282 
The monetary costs associated with responding to a government audit, 
while significant, are only one expense incurred by teaching hospitals or by 
any business which becomes the target of a government investigation.  Today, 
most government health care fraud audits or investigations are conducted by a 
team of investigators, including criminal investigators, auditors, billing 
specialists, and medical specialists.283  The investigation may proceed through 
grand jury subpoenas for records or testimony, Inspector General subpoenas 
for records or testimony, Civil Investigative Demands (“CIDs”) for records or 
testimony, search warrants, or agent interviews of employees, patients, 
competitors or vendors.284  The target of such an investigation must devote 
massive economic and human resources to respond to this investigation.  The 
investigative target must collect the required records, ensure that privileged 
records are appropriately designated and segregated as privileged, and retain 
adequate copies of records to carry on with business.285  Employees who are 
interviewed by investigators, whether informally or through subpoenas or 
CIDs, may require separate counsel.286  Often, the employer is obligated, or 
simply deems it wise, to pay legal fees incurred by its employees.287  
Employees and executives may be diverted from their usual duties to deal with 
the human, logistical, business, public relations and financial issues that arise 
during an investigation.288  Employees may leave for a less stressful 
environment, and recruiting new staff may become difficult.  As Dartmouth 
found, obtaining financing for expansion or even continuation of business 
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during a large-scale investigation may become difficult.289  If the target is 
publicly traded, stock prices may fall. 
Maintaining continuity is crucial for any business, whether under 
investigation or not.  For health care providers who treat ill patients, continuity 
during an investigation may become more than the financial bottom line: it 
may be a life or death matter.  Moreover, in a financially turbulent business 
environment, the disruptions caused by government fraud investigations can be 
especially serious.  It is hard to imagine a sector of the American economy 
which has experienced, and is still experiencing, more turmoil over the past 
decade than the health care industry. 
Because academic medical centers provide unique services for their local 
communities, disruption of their mission has an unusually profound impact.  
The 125 teaching hospitals associated with American medical schools perform 
four unique functions: (1) they are the major source of biomedical research in 
the world; (2) they provide the largest share of indigent health care in the 
United States; (3) they treat unusual and complex medical problems, both 
nationally and globally; and (4) they educate future physicians.  No other 
medical institution provides this combination of services.  Yet, academic 
medical centers are “in crisis” because the changing health care marketplace 
has eroded their infrastructure.290  Over the past two decades, efforts to cut 
health care costs have reduced revenues for virtually all health care providers.  
For most private physicians, this cost consciousness has led to consolidation of 
practices, reduced income and greater “management” of patients’ health care 
by insurers. 
For academic medical centers, the impact has been all of the above plus a 
threat to teaching hospitals’ fundamental existence.  For years these institutions 
have cross-subsidized their research, education and indigent care activities 
from patient revenues.291  As patient revenues decrease through managed care 
and other cost consciousness initiatives, there is less revenue for teaching 
hospitals to support these multiple missions.  Robbing Peter to pay Paul is no 
longer working. 
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Academic medical centers are the “backbone” of American biomedical 
research, which is foremost in the world.292  “[M]ost of the nation’s basic and 
clinical research advances are made”  at the 125 American academic medical 
centers.293  Over half of the research grants awarded by the National Institutes 
of Health (“NIH”) go to these centers.294  Many of the scientific advances 
made by American academic medical centers reduce expenses and improve the 
quality of life for millions of people.  For example, “[t]he annual cost of 
treating polio if a vaccine had not been found is estimated at $30 billion per 
year; [p]otassium citrate treatment for preventing recurrence of kidney stones 
saves an estimated $400-870 million per year; [t]he vaccine to prevent 
Haemophilus influenzae Type B (HiB) disease, the leading cause of bacterial 
meningitis in the United States, saves an estimated $350 million to $450 
million annually; [t]he heliobacter (H. pylori) discovery saves $600 million to 
$800 million annually in the treatment of ulcers.”295  Academic medical 
centers also test and develop surgical and patient care procedures that are 
adopted world-wide.296 
Despite its importance, the biomedical research mission of academic 
medical centers is under severe strain.  As one expert has noted, the financial 
pressures currently existing in health care “could have a devastating impact on 
the nation’s capacity to support medical research and education.”297  Studies 
have shown that teaching hospitals located in regions of “high managed care 
penetration have on average experienced a decreased rate of growth in NIH . . . 
[research] awards during the past 5 years, as well as relative declines in their 
overall ranking as awardee institutions and their market share of NIH 
extramural awards.”298  As the changing marketplace has emphasized direct 
patient care, academic physician-scientists have given up their attempt to do 
clinical research: the “proportion of investigators applying for clinical research 
grants from the National Institutes of Health (NIH) who are physicians has 
declined from 40% [in 1968] to 25% [in 1998].”299  Studies also have shown 
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that publication by clinical researchers “decreased significantly in competitive 
markets, while the rate of publication for other faculty remained 
unchanged.”300  It is expected that this market competition will “encourage 
faculty to increase patient care activities perhaps at the expense of their 
research and teaching activities” and “reduce[] institutional commitment to 
activities such as research and teaching . . . .”301 
The second unique service supplied by academic medical centers is their 
willingness to serve as the safety net for many medically indigent patients in 
the United States.302  Recent studies confirm that “medically indigent patients 
are concentrated in major teaching hospitals.”303  In fact, “[a]cademic medical 
centers [AMCs] supply over 50% of the nation’s care for indigents.”304  “As 
the ranks of uninsured Americans continue to swell and as America becomes 
more culturally and racially diverse, an increasing number of patients at risk of 
being underserved will turn to AMCs for care.”305 
There are several possible reasons for the concentration of medically 
indigent patients in academic medical centers: such centers tend to be located 
in inner cities, where most of the medically indigent reside; medically indigent 
patients tend to have complex medical conditions, such as human 
immunodeficiency virus (“HIV”), which academic medical centers are better 
able to treat; medically indigent persons tend to have a greater incidence of 
trauma injuries which academic medical centers, with their trauma centers, are 
better able to treat; most academic medical centers have long traditions of 
indigent care and “may be more willing than other hospitals to accept 
medically indigent patients.”306  Providing indigent care, however, comes at 
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high cost for academic medical centers.  For example, in 1994 (the date of the 
most recent data available) “[u]ncompensated care charges incurred by . . . 
AMCs averaged over $14 million per AMC for bad debt and $21 million per 
AMC for charity care.”307 
A third unique service provided by academic medical centers is their 
treatment of especially complex diseases.  Academic medical centers treat 
more complex medical conditions than do nonteaching hospitals.  Consider the 
following examples: 
 “96% of all bone marrow, liver, lung, and kidney transplants were 
performed at major teaching hospitals” (12% of all admissions at 
these hospitals);308 
 “Major teaching hospitals are four times more likely than community 
hospitals to offer reproductive health services and three times more 
likely to provide crisis prevention services.”309 
 “Major teaching hospitals are dominant in three areas of technology-
intensive services: accidents and other emergencies (e.g., burns, . . . 
level 1 emergency, and neonatal and pediatric ICU); new services 
with limited applications (e.g., PET scans); and care requiring 
extensive resources from multiple services (e.g., transplants).”310 
 The medically indigent, who concentrate in major teaching hospitals, 
have a higher prevalence of HIV disease.311 
Treating the sickest patients and the most complex diseases means that 
academic medical centers “do not fit naturally within managed care 
systems . . . [which] anticipate that the majority of health services will be for 
routine patient care in a relatively healthy population.”312  This “mis-fit” is 
especially serious given the dominance of managed care reimbursement in the 
American health care system.  Academic medical centers’ incompatibility with 
prevailing managed care reimbursement systems further destabilizes these 
institutions, especially vis-a-vis nonteaching hospitals that enhance their 
profitability under managed care reimbursement by shifting even more 
indigent health care to teaching hospitals.  Because of their multiple missions, 
academic medical centers are “non-competitive in a price-sensitive 
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environment.”313  One recent study calculated that the “average cost of care per 
admission was about $6000 in teaching hospitals . . . , as compared with about 
$4400 in nonteaching hospitals.”314  Not surprising, “health plans avoid 
contracting with teaching hospitals . . . because of their higher costs”315 and 
consequently “many academic institutions are overbedded, underused, and in 
turmoil.”316 
The last unique service performed by academic medical centers is 
education, not only of American medical students, residents and fellows, but 
also of selected physicians and scientists from around the world.  Although the 
Medicare program pays teaching hospitals for training these individuals, the 
amount paid does not adequately cover the cost of medical education: 
“graduate training is financed largely by revenues from patient care in teaching 
hospitals.”317 
In short, diverting the resources, time, and human capital of an academic 
medical center to respond to a health care fraud investigation disrupts the 
already fragile balance at teaching hospitals as they attempt to continue their 
unique mission. Subjecting these vulnerable institutions to the disruptions of a 
fraud investigation is a serious matter. 
There is much to learn from the PATH initiative about how to investigate 
suspected health care fraud.  There are important advantages to employing a 
national initiative strategy, both for the government and for the targets of the 
investigation.  When the suspected fraud is on a large scale, consolidation 
through a national initiative allows for a similarly large scale response, instead 
of a scattered and piecemeal approach.  Consolidation promotes an efficient 
use of resources; almost certainly ensures that every prosecuting office and 
every target has the benefit of experienced prosecutors and defense counsel 
from offices nationwide; provides greater opportunity to systematically change 
the source of any fraud; and enhances the potential for meaningful dialog 
among the parties on almost every issue.  However, as PATH has shown, the 
disadvantage of a national initiative is that if it is poorly focused, its 
destructive impact is compounded. 
Ironically, one of the most innovative law enforcement tactics employed in 
sophisticated investigations, especially in health care fraud investigations, may 
be a culprit when national initiatives go awry.  Parallel proceedings, through 
which the government employs a combination of criminal, civil and 
administrative sanctions to address improper conduct committed by a 
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defendant, have been available for years.318  The past decade has seen a more 
aggressive use of parallel proceedings, however, especially in health care.319  
There are reasons for this.  Intent to defraud can be difficult to prove in health 
care cases given the ambiguity of billing regulations and the diffusion of actual 
billing responsibility among personnel in many health care providers’ 
offices.320  Investigations that preserve the prosecutors’ option of proceeding 
administratively or civilly on determinations that the billing errors were 
unintentional, or proceeding criminally when evidence of intent is present, 
provide needed flexibility to deal with providers who have billed insurers 
improperly.  In addition, the complexity of billing regulations have required 
that criminal investigators team up with billing experts and auditors during the 
investigation.  This inter-team communication enhances the prospects for 
varied and multiple levels of prosecution.  Recognizing these facts, Congress 
has made available investigative tools, such as Inspector General subpoenas321 
and Civil Investigative Demands,322 that enhance the ability of law 
enforcement officials to share information obtained during an investigation 
with civil and administrative members of the investigation team.  Attorney 
General Janet Reno’s 1997 directive to United States Attorneys to make 
greater use of parallel proceedings recognizes these advantages: 
In order to maximize the efficient use of resources, it is essential that our 
attorneys consider whether there are investigative steps common to civil and 
criminal prosecutions, and to agency administrative actions. . . .  Accordingly, 
every United States Attorney’s office and each Department Litigation Division 
should have a system for coordinating the criminal, civil and administrative 
aspects of all white-collar crime matters within the office.323 
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Despite the flexibility they afford, parallel proceedings can alter an 
investigation’s dynamics.  When the investigation of health care fraud is 
conducted so as to preserve the potential for multiple levels of liability, 
especially criminal liability, communication between investigators and targets 
during an investigation is stifled.  As long as criminal charges or exclusion is a 
possible outcome of an investigation, investigators must be concerned about 
records being “lost” or destroyed, witnesses being tampered with, and files 
fabricated.  With these concerns, the government cannot caucus with the 
targets of its investigation as it formulates its investigation strategy.  This lost 
opportunity for candid dialog between regulator and regulated is unfortunate.  
Prior to the common use of parallel proceedings, when most billing 
irregularities were resolved by audit, the stakes were not as high, the concerns 
about the integrity of evidence were not as wide-spread and thus, early dialog 
between investigators and providers was more feasible. 
Early dialog may well have helped focus PATH.  In July, 1997, one year 
after the PATH initiative began, the General Counsel of HHS responded to 
substantial information supplied by the academic medical centers regarding 
PATH.324  The HHS Counsel agreed that “the standards for paying teaching 
physicians under Part B of Medicare have not been consistently and clearly 
articulated by HCFA over a period of decades.”325  The OIG then curtailed the 
scope of future PATH audits.326  Such dialog undoubtedly would have been 
beneficial earlier in the formulation of the PATH initiative. 
Because many white collar investigations have the potential of disrupting 
society, the prosecutive decision to proceed with an investigation entailing 
potential criminal, civil or administrative liability should be undertaken with 
care.  A formal assessment of the economic and societal impact of the 
prospective investigation should be part of the decision-making process.  
Currently, prosecutors are not hired, nor trained, to evaluate the economic, 
social and market impact of a large-scale fraud investigation.  That should 
change.  A plethora of governmental working groups exists to coordinate 
health care fraud investigations and government direction.  These or similar 
groups should be utilized to help provide prosecutors with necessary 
information on industry.327 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
There is a large, aggressive law enforcement machine poised to pursue 
health care fraud.  It is supplied with ample resources and powerful statutory 
weapons, including criminal statutes carrying twenty year terms of 
imprisonment and mandatory forfeiture; the FCA with its huge, statutorily-set 
monetary awards; and administrative sanctions that can demolish a health care 
provider. 
The weapons available to combat health care fraud are appropriately 
powerful.  The health care provider who has intentionally and systematically 
set out to defraud health care insurers and patients is a predator and should be 
pursued relentlessly, with the full force of all sanctions available.  Because of 
the size and complexity of the American health care system, insurers who pay 
health care bills are especially vulnerable to fraud.  Honesty and a good faith 
effort to comply with applicable billing regulations are essential for the 
American health care system to stay afloat.  Moreover, fraudulent health care 
providers do more than cheat insurers of money.  Their actions may harm 
patients, who by definition, are ill and dependent on others for the most basic 
of care.  The health care providers who breach these fiduciary relationships 
deserve the condemnation of society as conveyed by our most severe 
sanctions, should be flushed out of the health care system, and should be held 
forth as examples for maximum deterrent effect.  Because of their ability to 
efficiently address nationwide fraud practices, national initiatives are 
invaluable auditing and investigative strategies in detecting and deterring such 
health care providers. 
However, as the PATH initiative has demonstrated, care should be taken in 
deploying the formidable weapons available to combat health care fraud.  
There is a danger that the health care fraud law enforcement machine that 
exists will take on a life of its own, where the focus becomes numbers: of 
investigations undertaken, convictions, fines, damages, penalties, and 
exclusions, rather than achieving the best health care for Americans at a fair 
cost.  The PATH initiative is illustrative for two reasons.  First, it exemplifies 
the difficulty of detecting fraud in a highly regulated area governed by multiple 
regulations.  Second, it demonstrates the hardship created for targets of fraud 
investigations. 
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No one could dispute that hardship or not, fraudulent institutions should be 
aggressively investigated and relentlessly prosecuted.  However, the internal 
and social costs of such investigations are high, and care should be taken so 
that the mystique of the health care fraud law enforcement machine does not 
seduce the regulator into becoming a hunter when there is no prey.  Pursuit of 
fraudulent health care providers is only one aspect of a functional health care 
system; understanding when a systemic regulatory breakdown has occurred is 
also vital.  The current emphasis on prosecuting fraudulent health care 
providers threatens to sweep aside this less glamorous analysis.  The 
Departments of Justice and Health and Human Services and Congress should 
be just as vigilant in creating incentives for the proper exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion as they have been in building a well-oiled machine to combat health 
care fraud. 
